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You receive a call one day from a local judge, asking you to take a case that, 
the judge assures you, will not take up much of your time.  The judge wants 
you to represent a man who has been arrested on a charge of possession of 
marijuana; there is nothing special about the case, the judge tells you, but the 
local public defender organization is unable to represent the man due to a 
conflict, and he has no money to hire an attorney.  You agree to represent him, 
thinking that the case could not be too complex and, when you receive the 
discovery from the prosecution, it seems to be open-and-shut.  Two police 
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officers saw your new client smoking marijuana behind a shopping mall and 
arrested him.  You know that the maximum penalty for a first-time offender—
like your client—is sixty days in jail, and the judge to whom the case is 
assigned invariably gives first-time marijuana offenders a small fine and 
thirty days of probation. 
When you meet your client, he tells you that he wants to put this case behind 
him as quickly as possible.  As you begin to explain to him his options, he 
immediately tells you that he wants to plead guilty.  He goes on to say to you 
that he knows that he must plead guilty because he saw devils in the courtroom 
when he was arraigned, and the devils told him that they would torture him if 
he went to trial.  In describing this, your client begins to cry and insists that 
you arrange for him to plead guilty as soon as possible. 
Not only do you know the relatively light consequences to your client if he 
pleads guilty to this charge, you also know the consequences of raising with the 
court doubts about your client’s competency.  The law in your state requires the 
judge to order a competency evaluation if there exists a reasonable possibility 
that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, and such evaluations are 
done at the state mental hospital, on an in-patient basis.  If you raise the issue 
of competency, then you are certain that your client will be held at the state 
mental hospital for at least sixty days while the evaluation is completed, 
possibly longer.  If your client is ultimately found incompetent, the law allows 
that he may be civilly committed to an indefinite period of confinement at the 
state mental hospital.  You also remember learning in your professional 
responsibility class in law school that all lawyers are officers of the court and, 
as such, have an obligation of candor to the court and some responsibility to 
maintain the integrity of the legal system. 
What do you do?  Do you tell the court, heedless of the consequences to your 
client, that you believe your client is delusional and not competent to proceed?  
Do you keep your doubts to yourself and your fingers crossed that your client 
makes it through a guilty plea without talking about the devils that visit him?  
Now assume that, instead of insisting on a guilty plea, your client insists on a 
trial.  Who decides on your theory of defense?  Which witnesses to call?  
Whether to try your case to a jury or to a judge?  Where do you turn for 
guidance?  Do you do what your mentally impaired client tells you to do?  
What you think he would want if not for his mental illness?  What you think 
is best for him?  Can you be both a zealous advocate and an officer of the 
court?  Of course, you are wondering why you ever agreed to take this case. 
INTRODUCTION 
If there is one foundational principle of legal ethics about which 
scholars, practitioners, and the public might agree, it is that a lawyer 
should do no harm to her client.  Upon examination, however, this 
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principle turns out to be shakier than it first appears.  On some 
occasions, rules of ethics may force the lawyer to do just that.  The 
obligations of acting as a zealous advocate for one’s client and as an 
officer of the court do at times conflict, and that tension is most 
acutely felt in the case of the criminal defense lawyer.1  The criminal 
defense lawyer’s role as zealous partisan occupies a position unique 
in the legal profession.  The duty of the criminal defense lawyer 
toward her client has been called “one of singular devotion; the 
lawyer is devoted to the client and the client only.”2  The United 
States Supreme Court eloquently articulated the unique role of the 
defense lawyer within the adversarial system:  “[A] defense lawyer best 
serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert 
with it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of his 
client.’”3  Given this uniquely partisan role,4 in what sense is the 
defense lawyer an “officer of the court”?  This uneasy positioning of 
the defense lawyer leads to difficult ethical decisions; in no situation 
is the tension more pronounced than in the context of representing 
a client who is mentally impaired. 
Every criminal defendant has an absolute right to control certain 
aspects of her case.  Decisions regarding whether to go to trial or 
enter a guilty plea, whether to testify, and whether to have her case 
decided by a judge or a jury ultimately belong exclusively to the 
defendant.5  According to traditional legal ethics, while the defendant 
 1. See Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 
605 (1985) (stating that the criminal defense context is that in which “the case for 
undiluted partisanship is most compelling”). 
 2. Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in Criminal Defense:  Some Thoughts on Lynne 
Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31, 42 (2002).  Smith also calls it a “sacred duty.”  Id.  In 
support of this view of the lawyer-client relationship, Smith cites the work of Charles 
P. Curtis regarding legal ethics.  Curtis described his view succinctly:  “[The lawyer’s] 
loyalty runs to his client.  He has no other master.”  Id. at 42 n.91 (citing Charles P. 
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3 (1951–1952)). 
 3. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (Powell, J.). 
 4. Justice Powell’s understanding of the unique role of the defense lawyer is not 
universally shared.  In Nix v. Whiteside, Chief Justice Burger opined that the defense 
lawyer’s responsibilities and duties as an officer of the court are “equally solemn” as 
the defense lawyer’s duty to advocate for her client.  475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).  Chief 
Justice Burger, like many judges, tended to privilege the lawyer’s role as an officer of 
the court above the lawyer’s role as advocate or partisan.  See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 
U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The role of a lawyer as an officer of 
the court predates the Constitution; it was carried over from the English system and 
became firmly embedded in our tradition.  It included the obligation of first duty to 
client.  But that duty never was and is not today an absolute or unqualified duty.”). 
 5. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (setting forth the 
general framework within which decisions are to be made during the scope of 
representation).  That rule provides that: 
 [A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which 
they are to be pursued . . . .  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the 
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controls these core aspects of the litigation, the lawyer controls the 
strategic decisions.6  Whether to call certain witnesses, for example, 
and whether and how to cross-examine the government’s witnesses 
are traditionally considered to rest with the discretion of the lawyer.7  
These very general rules, however, are of limited utility to a defense 
lawyer who finds herself in disagreement with her client and caught 
in a dilemma between respecting her client’s right to autonomous 
decision-making and her own desire to serve the best interests of her 
client. 
A criminal defense lawyer who believes in a client-centered model 
of representation8 must necessarily accept that she will at times take 
actions that will be harmful to her client.  The competent, rational 
client has a right to make decisions that are counter-productive, 
harmful, and even disastrous.9  The client-centered lawyer must 
client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 
Id.  The allocation of decisional power set forth in Rule 1.2(a) is, at least in the first 
instance, universally accepted and uncontroversial.  A precise delineation between 
“objectives” and “tactics,” however, can be elusive in practice.  See DAVID BINDER & 
SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:  A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 
192 (1977) (emphasizing that client-centered decision-making is not always possible, 
for example, because of clients who are indecisive, or insist on following the lawyer’s 
opinion, or insist on their own opinion regardless of the lawyer’s advice). 
 6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2002) (explaining that, 
when in disagreement, clients will normally defer to their lawyer with respect to 
“tactical” matters). 
 7. Id. 
 8. For a nuanced description of the history and theoretical underpinnings of 
client-centered lawyering, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand:  The Plural 
Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).  Rodney Uphoff 
contrasts client-centered lawyering with the traditional lawyer-centered approach by 
locating the focus of ultimate decision-making power.  Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should 
Control the Decision To Call a Witness:  Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000).  Client-centered lawyering, he writes: 
 [A]ssumes that clients often are in a better position to make case decisions 
because so many decisions actually turn on the client’s values and priorities 
that the client alone best appreciates.  The lawyer’s role in this model, then, 
is to provide clients with meaningful information so as to empower clients to 
make informed choices about their cases. 
Id. at 769; see also BINDER & PRICE, supra note 5, at 143 (“[T]he responsibility for 
identifying the probable legal consequences of any particular alternative must rest 
with the lawyer.”); Stephen Ellman, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 728 
(1987) (emphasizing the importance of client decision-making over unruly power 
and manipulation a lawyer often has over her client’s case); Monroe H. Freedman, 
Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 55–56 (1991) (“I think of 
lawyers’ ethics as rooted in the Bill of Rights as expressed in our constitutionalized 
adversary system.  My view of lawyers’ ethics is, therefore, client-centered, 
emphasizing the lawyer’s role in enhancing the client’s autonomy as a free person in 
a free society.”). 
 9. What of the rational, competent client who freely chooses to forego her only 
viable defense?  A classic example is the story of “The Long Black Veil,” a country 
ballad about a man who chooses to be executed for a crime he did not commit 
rather than to reveal his alibi.  The song was originally recorded by Lefty Frizzell in 
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accept that her role is to assist her rational, competent client in 
achieving the client’s goals, even if those goals are not what the 
lawyer would have chosen.  Taken to its extreme, however, a model of 
absolute client-centered decision-making can devolve into an 
abdication of responsibility on the part of the defense lawyer.  In 
cases involving criminal defendants suffering serious mental 
impairment, the very reasoning behind the model of client-centered 
representation and client autonomy10 can fall apart, especially in cases 
involving defendants who, although competent to stand trial, are 
“decisionally incompetent”11 and, therefore, unable meaningfully to 
assist in their own defenses. 
A significant number of prisoners in state and federal jails and 
prison suffer from some form of severe mental illness.12 Today, two of 
the nation’s largest mental health providers are the Los Angeles 
1959 and made popular again by Johnny Cash in 1968.  The innocent man chooses 
to die rather than reveal the truth: 
Ten years ago, on a cold dark night 
Someone was killed, ‘neath the town hall light 
There were few at the scene, but they all agreed 
That the slayer who ran, looked a lot like me . . . . 
The judge said son, what is your alibi 
If you were somewhere else, then you won’t have to die 
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life 
For I’d been in the arms of my best friend’s wife 
JOHNNY CASH, The Long Black Veil, on AT FOLSOM PRISON (Columbia Records 1968) 
(lyrics by Marijohn Wilkin and Danny Dill, 1959). David Luban addressed the “Long 
Black Veil” situation in terms of legal ethics in his excellent article, Paternalism and the 
Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 456.  Luban adopts Dennis Thompson’s 
definition of paternalism:  “‘the imposing of constraints on an individual’s liberty for 
the purpose of promoting his or her own good.’”  Id. at 461 (citing Dennis 
Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 246 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980)). 
 10. On the question of autonomy as a motivating principle in the criminal justice 
system, see generally Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. 
L. REV. 621 (2005).  Toone argues that the United States Supreme Court’s reliance 
upon autonomy in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and the subsequent 
constitutional procedural cases misplace defendant autonomy as a constitutional 
value.  Toone, supra, at 650.  Given the constraints under which any criminal 
defendant operates, argues Toone, it is meaningless to speak of criminal defendants 
as possessing any sort of meaningful “autonomy.”  Id.  The illusory touchstone of 
“defendant autonomy,” according to Toone, should not be allowed to hold sway over 
more meaningful principles of the criminal justice system like accuracy, efficiency, 
and fairness.  Id. at 635. 
 11. See infra Part II (discussing the distinction between competency to waive 
counsel and competency to proceed to trial). 
 12. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH 
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.  Among all jail inmates, twenty-
four percent reported at least one symptom of psychotic disorder, and sixty-four 
percent reported some degree of mental health problems.  Id. 
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County Jail and the Cook County (Chicago) Jail.13  The shift in the 
United States from the institutionalization of the mentally ill in 
mental hospitals to the incarceration of the mentally ill in jails and 
prisons has been well-documented.14  In 1955, the institutionalization 
rate of people in mental hospitals was 339 per 100,000; today, the 
number is fewer than 20 people per 100,000.15  Where did those vast 
populations of the mentally ill go?  To jails and prisons.16  As the 
institutionalization rate fell over the course of the last fifty years, the 
incarceration rate has risen accordingly.17  While the national 
incarceration rate in the mid-1950s was approximately 162 per 
100,000, it is currently over 700 per 100,000, nearly a five-fold 
increase.18
 13. See Jennifer Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Correcting Discrimination 
of Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and Pretrial Processes, 23 LAW & 
INEQ. 157, 160–61 (2005) (stating that Cook County reported “1,000 out of 11,000 
inmates as having a mental illness” and that Los Angeles County Jail houses about 
“2,800 persons with a mental illness” giving it the reputation as the “nation’s largest 
de facto psychiatric institution”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. 
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 16 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf (“Jails and prisons have become, in effect, the 
country’s front-line mental health providers.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 
265–68 (2007) (detailing the problems in the criminal justice system with a rising 
incarceration rate); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison:  Rethinking the 
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2006) (arguing that mental 
hospitalization rates must be aggregated with incarceration rates to accurately reflect 
and interpret the rise of the incarceration rate in the United States). 
 15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED:  U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 19–20 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ 
usa1003/usa1003.pdf (stating that due to lack of funds from the federal and state 
government, mental hospitals and community-based mental health services were not 
able to adequately provide treatment for the mentally ill, which led to an increase in, 
among other things, the incarceration rate). 
 16. This shift has been described in vivid terms by one commentator:  “Over the 
past 40 years, the United States dismantled a colossal mental health complex and 
rebuilt—bed by bed—an enormous prison.”  Bernard E. Harcourt, Op-Ed, The 
Mentally Ill, Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A15. 
 17. See id. (“[W]e now incarcerate more than two million people—resulting in 
the highest incarceration number and rate in the world, five times that of Britain and 
12 times that of Japan.”).  Indeed, Professor Harcourt points out that the total rate of 
institutionalization (including in mental hospitals, asylums, jails, and prisons) is 
actually lower today than in the 1940s and 1950s.  See id. (explaining that we have 
been a culture that institutionalizes people since the 1940s and 1950s, but 
emphasizing that people that used to get mental health treatment are now “getting a 
one-way ticket to jail”). 
 18. PAIGE HARRISON & ALAN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MID-YEAR 2005 2 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf.  Harrison and Beck included prison and jail inmates in both 
the federal and state systems and calculated that, as of June 30, 2005, 738 out of every 
100,000 people in the United States were incarcerated.  Id.; see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 15, at 19–20 (noting the incarceration rate in the 1950s); JUSTICE 
POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE:  PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE 
MILLENNIUM 1–2 (2000), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/ 
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Against this backdrop, defense lawyers for the indigent are placed 
in an untenable situation.  As prisons and jails become the new 
“treatment” facilities for the nation’s mentally ill, criminal defense 
lawyers for the poor are increasingly asked to play various, often-
conflicting roles in the service of their clients and the courts.19  As 
mental illness has become an increasingly prominent and 
problematic factor in the representation of indigent criminal 
defendants, ethics have not caught up with the realities of day-to-day 
practice.20  What is a well-meaning, client-centered defense lawyer to 
do when her client is making self-destructive and senseless decisions 
not as the result of rational thought, but because of a mental illness 
or impairment that prevents the client from making a rational 
decision?  Before even reaching the questions of the proper 
allocation of decisional power within the context of an attorney-client 
relationship with a mentally impaired client, the lawyer has a 
preliminary determination to make:  is the lawyer required to bring 
to the court’s attention her concerns regarding her client’s 
competency?  This Article attempts to provide some guidance 
regarding decision-making, allocation of power, and evolving 
concepts of autonomy and paternalism in the context of criminal 
defense representation. 
This Article addresses two related dilemmas facing the criminal 
defense lawyer who represents a client who—although arguably 
punishing.pdf (charting the rising incarceration rate in the United States over the 
course of the twentieth century). 
 19. See Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential To Teach About Mental Health Issues 
in Criminal Law (and a Primer on How To Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 407 
(2004) (arguing that the changing demographics of criminal defendants require that 
we change the way we train criminal defense lawyers). 
 20. Professor Stanley Herr has complained about the lack of meaningful 
guidance that existing ethical codes offer to lawyers attempting conscientiously to 
represent mentally impaired clients.  Stanley Herr, Representation of Clients with 
Disabilities:  Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609 (1991).  
Professor Herr writes that: 
[T]he codes of the organized bar foster confusion about the lawyer’s proper 
roles and the scope of the aid lawyers should offer clients.  Exacerbated by 
the disabled client’s poverty, physical isolation, or unusual legal problems, 
this lack of clear ethical guidance may lead some lawyers to shun mentally 
disabled clients.  Even worse, such imprecision may contribute to 
substandard legal representation and a failure to attend to clients with 
mental disabilities. 
Id. at 615.  Herr criticizes both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as providing insufficient guidance to 
attorneys struggling with issues of ethical decision-making in their representation of 
clients with mental disability.  “While sympathetic to the lawyer’s predicament,” he 
writes, “the drafters’ suggestion that the lawyer turn to ‘an appropriate diagnostician’ 
for guidance too narrowly conceives the dilemma.  The problem is ethical and not 
clinical.”  Id. at 620. 
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competent to stand trial—has a mental impairment that prevents the 
client from making rational decisions about how to proceed with her 
case:  first, whether to raise with the court her concerns that her 
client may be incompetent, and second, how to make strategic 
decisions about the case when faced with opposition by a mentally 
impaired client. 
Part I of the Article examines the historical development of the 
concepts of candor, zeal, and the lawyer’s obligation to protect 
confidences and secrets in the course of the representation.  Part II 
addresses some fundamental legal principles surrounding 
competency to stand trial and the legal framework within which 
competency is assessed and litigated in a criminal case, as well as 
some of the critiques of the current legal paradigm of competency.  
Part III discusses the ethical rules guiding defense counsel in 
representing a mentally impaired client, and examines the 
shortcomings of that guidance.  Part IV describes two real-life 
scenarios encountered by criminal defense lawyers and discusses the 
appropriate decision-making strategies that could be used in those 
actual examples.  Part V argues first that a defense lawyer cannot 
ethically raise doubts regarding her client’s competency when doing 
so would cause harm to her client, and goes on to propose a new 
framework within which a criminal defense lawyer can decide 
whether, to what extent, and how she may substitute her own 
judgment for that of her mentally impaired client. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that the historic role of zeal as a 
guiding principle in the ethics of criminal defense requires that the 
criminal defense lawyer be endowed with significant discretion in 
determining first, whether to raise issues of competency and second, 
in how to engage in surrogate decision-making for her mentally 
impaired client.  This Article rejects the view of some commentators 
and courts that the lawyer’s role as officer of the court requires the 
lawyer to raise doubts about her client’s competency21 and argues, to 
the contrary, that the dignity and moral authority of the criminal 
justice system is best served by a defense lawyer being free to operate 
solely in the interest of her client. 
 21. E.g., State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Wis. 1986) (holding that where 
defense counsel has reason to doubt her client’s competency, she is obligated to raise 
the issue with the trial court). 
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I. CANDOR, ZEAL, AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
Fundamentally, the dilemma faced by the criminal defense lawyer 
representing an arguably incompetent client is a dilemma of two 
conflicting duties:  the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the court22 and 
the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation.23  As an officer of the 
court, some argue, a lawyer has a responsibility to protect and uphold 
the integrity of the process by which the system adjudicates those who 
come before it.24  On the other hand, the defense lawyer, more than 
any other actor in the criminal justice process, has historically been 
seen as appropriately having different goals than the “system” 
generally; as a zealous advocate for her client, the defense lawyer 
need not concern herself with the search for the truth, or with the 
reliability of the process.25  The duties of candor and zeal, then, 
inexorably conflict in the world of criminal defense; the lawyer’s 
obligation to protect confidences and secrets learned in the course of 
the representation26 adds another dimension to the debate about the 
appropriate role of the defense lawyer faced with conflicting duties. 
A. A Brief History of Candor 
A lawyer’s obligation to “speak the truth” has, at least to some 
degree, been a fundamental principle of the legal profession for 
centuries.27  Like the concept of zeal, however, the duty of candor is 
defined in the details.  Lawyers in ancient Rome were required to 
swear an oath “to avoid artifice and circumlocution” and “to speak 
only that which he believes to be true.”28  By the thirteenth century, at 
 22. See infra Part I.A (describing the history of an attorney’s duty of candor to the 
tribunal). 
 23. See infra Part I.B (recounting the history of an attorney’s duty of zealous 
advocacy). 
 24. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham’s Bromide:  Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 
30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 122 (1996–1997) (arguing that the duty lawyers have to their 
country and their clients are the same—that is to zealously advocate for their client 
within the boundaries set by the law).  Uelmen adds that “[t]he premise of the 
adversary system is that the goal of fair adjudication is more likely to be served if 
lawyers function as zealous advocates for their clients.”  Id. 
 25. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.   
 26. See infra Part I.C (outlining an attorney’s obligation to not disclose 
information communicated by her client in confidence). 
 27. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers:  An 800-Year 
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2004) (arguing that six traditional primary 
duties of lawyers in medieval England—litigation fairness, competence, loyalty, 
confidentiality, reasonable fees, and public service—are still the central duties of 
modern lawyers). 
 28. See id. at 1392–93 (noting that oaths were one of the first methods used to 
enforce ethical standards of legal conduct with a central theme of fairness and 
honesty) (citing JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 19 
(1909) and Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 19 WKLY. L. BULL. & OHIO L.J. 47, 49 (1888)).  
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least certain English lawyers were subject to discipline for attempts to 
present false testimony “or to suppress the truth.”29  The thread 
continues through English legal history; four centuries after the 
ecclesiastical oaths described above, Lord Commissioner Whitelocke 
explained the duties of a seventeenth-century English lawyer.30  In a 
1648 speech to new lawyers, Lord Whitelocke described the three 
“general” duties of the lawyer:  secrecy, diligence, and fidelity.31  He 
went on to discuss in more detail the lawyer’s duty to protect client 
confidences and secrets,32 to maintain loyalty to the client,33 and to be 
candid with the courts.34
Many of the American colonies adopted some version of the “do 
no falsehood” oaths from England, in which lawyers were required to 
swear to some version of a duty of candor toward the tribunal.  A 
1701 law required all lawyers in the colony of Massachusetts to swear 
a typical such oath: 
 You shall do no falsehood, nor consent to any to be done in the 
court, and if you know of any to be done you shall give knowledge 
thereof to the Justices of the Court, or some of them, that it may be 
According to Cox, the ancient Greek oath contained similar exhortations, requiring 
its adherents to “represent the bare truth, without any ornament or figure of 
rhetoric, or insinuating means to win the favor or more the affection of the judges.”  
Id. at 1393 n.54 (citing Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 19 WKLY. L. BULL. & OHIO L.J. 47, 49 
(1888)).  
 29. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1393 (“The decree also warned that advocates 
who . . . ‘suppress the truth’ would be suspended from office and subjected to 
additional punishment for repeated violations.”). 
 30. Id. at 1400–01. 
 31. See id. (citing WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 352 (1732)) (noting that lawyers 
were not only subject to formal standards, but also oaths and academic speeches that 
contributed to the meaning of their duties as advocates to their community).  Lord 
Whitelocke was addressing a group of men who were becoming “serjeants,” 
considered to be the elite of the English legal profession, trained in common law and 
pleading.  See id. at 1391–92 (noting that serjeants often represented the king and 
were considered the best of the profession).  Lord Whitelocke’s three basic duties of 
a serjeant—secrecy, diligence, and fidelity—have been referred to as “the pegs for an 
exposition of the central rules of professional responsibility.”  ROSS CRANSTON, LEGAL 
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1995). 
 32. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1400 n.117 (“For secrecy:  advocates are a king 
of confessors, and ought to be such, to whom the client may with confidence lay 
open his evidences, and the naked truth of his case, sub sigillo, and he ought not to 
discover them to his client’s prejudice; nor will the law compel him to it.” (quoting 
WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 355 (1732))). 
 33. See id. at 1400 n.119 (“For fidelity:  it is accounted vinculum societatis.  The 
name of unfaithfulness is hateful in all; and more in advocates than others, whom 
the client trusts with his livelihood, without which his life is irksome; and the 
unfaithfulness or fraud of the one is the ruin of the other.” (quoting WHITELOCKE’S 
MEMORIALS 355 (1732))). 
 34. See id. at 1400 n.116 (“An advocate owes to the court a just and true 
information.  The zeal of his client’s cause, as it must not transport him to 
irreverence, so it must not mislead him to untruths in his information of the court.” 
(quoting WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 355 (1732))). 
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reformed.  You shall not wittingly and willingly promote, sue or 
procure to be sued any false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or 
consent to the same.  You shall delay no man for lucre or malice, 
but you shall use yourself in the office of an attorney within the 
court according to the best of your learning and discretion, and 
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to your clients.  So help 
you God.35
Codes of conduct and lawyers’ oaths in pre-Revolutionary and early 
America did not stress the duty of zeal or confidentiality to the extent 
that earlier English precedent had.36
Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model 
Rules”) sets forth a modern articulation of the lawyer’s duty of 
candor toward the tribunal.37  Rule 3.3 would impose upon lawyers a 
broad obligation of disclosure toward the court that will inevitably 
 35. Id. at 1415 n.206 (citing HORRIS R. BAILEY, ATTORNEYS AND THEIR ADMISSION 
TO THE BAR IN MASSACHUSETTS 16 (1907)). 
 36. Id. at 1422–23 (noting the duty of confidentiality did not appear in colonial 
and early American regulations regarding lawyers’ conduct).  
 37. Rule 3.3 directs: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer; 
(2)  fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of 
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(3)  offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer, the 
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material 
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the 
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false. 
(b)  A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who 
knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in 
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take 
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal. 
(c)  The duties stated in paragraph (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion 
of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 [Confidentiality of 
Information]. 
(d)  In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all 
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).  Interestingly, with regard to the 
attorney’s obligation to disclose adverse legal authority pursuant to Rule 3.3(a)(3), a 
1972 survey of attorneys in Washington, D.C., found that only seven percent would 
disclose adverse legal authority, while ninety-three percent would not.  Monroe H. 
Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV. 833, 837 (1982).  
Freedman correctly argues that we should not overlook the overwhelming weight of 
this practical viewpoint in crafting ethical rules to guide the profession.  Id. 
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conflict with the lawyers’ duties as advocate.38  As made explicit in 
Rule 3.3(b), the Model Rules reject the view that, at least in certain 
cases, preserving the sanctity of client confidences should trump the 
lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal.39  Put another way, the 
Model Rules resolve quite facilely the dilemma between the criminal 
defense lawyer’s competing roles, and simply declare that the lawyer’s 
duty of candor toward the tribunal trumps the lawyer’s role as zealous 
advocate for her client.40
The commentary to Rule 3.3 makes clear that the lawyer’s 
obligation of candor toward the tribunal is premised on the lawyer’s 
role as an “officer of the court” and, as such, on an idea of the lawyer 
as having a responsibility to uphold the “integrity of the adjudicative 
process.”41  The commentary to Rule 3.3 recognizes that the attorney 
has a professional responsibility—as an advocate—both to present 
her client’s case with “persuasive force” and to maintain client 
confidences, but swiftly moves to qualify these advocacy-based duties.  
 38. When the Model Rules were under consideration, one area of significant 
disagreement had to do with whether the arguably broadened duty of candor would 
interfere with the attorney’s historic role as zealous advocate.  See Freedman, supra 
note 37, at 837–39 (arguing that it should not be required for lawyers to cite adverse 
authority when overlooked by opposing counsel because of the lawyers duty of loyalty 
and zealous representation, as discussed in Canons 5 and 7 of the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility); see also Daisy Hurst Floyd, Note, Candor Versus Advocacy:  
Courts’ Use of Sanctions To Enforce the Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV. 
1035, 1039–40 & n.19 (1995) (arguing that the duty of candor is so narrowly drawn 
in the Model Rules as to render it meaningless). 
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002) (“A lawyer who 
represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person 
intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct 
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”). 
 40. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS:  THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 441 (2000) (noting that although the consequences of 
disclosing criminal behavior or false testimony can be “grave” to the client, the 
alternative—subverting the advocacy process and possibly the attorney being a party 
to fraud—is worse).  Rotunda agrees with the approach of the Model Rules but 
points out that the view is not universally held.  Id.  An outspoken opponent of this 
approach is Monroe Freedman.  See, e.g., MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2–8 (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM] 
(emphasizing complete confidentiality between the attorney and her client, except 
for very narrow exceptions); MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS] (“The ethic of zeal is, therefore, pervasive in lawyers’ professional 
responsibilities because it informs all of the lawyer’s other ethical obligations with 
entire devotion to the interest of the client.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (noting that advocacy for 
one’s client is “qualified” by candor to the process); see also id. at 3.3 cmt. 12 (noting 
that criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding must be disclosed to 
the tribunal in order to preserve the integrity of adjudicative process). 
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The lawyer’s role as advocate “is qualified by the advocate’s duty of 
candor toward the tribunal.”42
The obligation of candor is often-cited and ill-defined.  In almost 
no factual context is there a consensus on what the defense lawyer is 
(and is not) required to do in order to fulfill this obligation of 
candor.  As noted by Monroe Freedman, the Model Rules continue to 
dodge the irreconcilable conflict between this “obligation” and other 
mandatory duties of the lawyer:  “[One way] of avoiding the difficult 
questions has been by issuing statements or codifications of rules of 
conduct in such a way as to give lip service to basic systemic values, 
while ignoring the fact that some of those values are fundamentally at 
odds with each other.”43  To understand what meaning candor has 
and what limitations it places upon the defense lawyer, one must look 
at the concept alongside the other ethical concepts that guide the 
lawyer. 
B. A Brief History of Zeal 
Like the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal, the concept 
of zeal in the lawyer’s representation of her client has antecedents in 
early Roman law.44  Charles Wolfram has described zeal as central to 
the role of the lawyer in our legal system:  “[T]he American lawyer’s 
professional model is that of zeal:  a lawyer is expected to devote 
energy, intelligence, skill, and personal commitment to the single 
goal of furthering the client’s interests as those are ultimately defined 
by the client.”45  Wolfram goes on to cite Canon 15 of the 1908 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Canons of Professional Ethics: 
 The lawyer owes “entire devotion to the interest of the client, 
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the 
exertion of his utmost learning and ability,” to the end that 
nothing be taken or be withheld from him save by the rules of law, 
 42. Id. at 3.3 cmt. 2. 
 43. FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 40, at vii. 
 44. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 54 (1953) 
(describing Roman laws from the third century that prohibited, for example, a 
lawyer from accepting a fee and not thereafter pursuing a case, or a lawyer accepting 
fees from opposing sides in a case); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 1389–1408 
(describing standards of professional conduct in England before the nineteenth 
century, emphasizing its impact of the standards in the United States).  
 45. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 578 (1986); see Abbe Smith, 
Burdening the Least of Us:  ‘Race-Conscious’ Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1585, 1589 (1999) (describing the requirement of zealous advocacy “the central 
ethical mandate for criminal lawyers”). 
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legally applied.  No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity 
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.46
The concept of zeal as a guiding principle for any lawyer in the 
Anglo-American legal system is uncontroversial.47  By the end of the 
thirteenth century, all English lawyers practicing in the ecclesiastical 
courts were required to swear that they would “diligently and 
faithfully serve their clients.”48
As deeply ingrained in our legal culture as the principle of zealous 
representation, similarly accepted is the fact that the principle of 
zealous representation is not absolute and is, in fact, well-qualified.49  
A lawyer, to use the most obvious example, is not permitted to 
commit a crime in order to benefit her client.  Anita Bernstein charts 
the waxing and waning of the bounds of zeal in her article, The Zeal 
Shortage, and suggests that the ideal of zeal, if perhaps not the practice 
of zeal, “may have hit its peak in ‘vigor’ about a hundred years ago.”50  
Bernstein laments the demise of zeal as a lawyerly ideal, and calls for 
a return to “this great ideal . . . up there in the professional-
responsibility pantheon next to loyalty and competence.”51  
Unfortunately, zeal today may be faring no better in practice than in 
 46. WOLFRAM, supra note 45, at 578.  According to Wolfram, the quotation in 
Canon 15 is attributable to George Sharswood.  Id. (citing GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN 
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 24 (2d ed. 1860)).  Alabama was the first state to 
adopt a code of ethics for lawyers in 1887.  Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of 
the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, in CAROL RICE ANDREWS ET 
AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS:  ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE 
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 7, 7 (2003) [hereinafter ANDREWS, GILDED AGE LEGAL 
ETHICS].  The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics provided that “[a]n attorney ‘owes entire 
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of 
his cause, and the exertion of the utmost skill and ability,’ to the end, that nothing 
may be taken or withheld from him.”  CODE OF ETHICS para. 10 (Ala. State Bar Ass’n 
1887), reprinted in ANDREWS, GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, supra, at 45, 50. 
 47. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (explaining that 
the lawyer has many roles in society, one of which is being a zealous advocate for her 
client). 
 48. The history of the development of ethics oaths and the evolution of ethical 
requirements for advocates in thirteenth-century England are detailed in Andrews, 
supra note 27, at 1387.  Notably, the same regulations, promulgated in 1295, that 
required this early version of the duty of zeal to one’s client also provided for 
appointment of counsel at no cost to indigent litigants.  See id. at 1394 (explaining 
that the regulations provided, besides “appointment of counsel for indigent 
litigants,” other standards, such as litigation fairness, candor, and reasonable fees 
(citing PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 154 (1992)).  By 1312, 
lawyers in the ecclesiastical courts were required to represent the poor at no cost.  See 
id. at 1394 & n.69 (explaining that the duty to serve the poor was documented as 
early as the twelfth century). 
 49. See WOLFRAM, supra note 45, at 579 (“Indeed, the approach of most discourses 
on the work of lawyers—as of all of the lawyer codes and treatises such as this—is to 
postulate a principle of zeal and then move quickly and more voluminously to hedge 
it about with necessary restrictions and qualifications.”). 
 50. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2006). 
 51. Id. at 1169. 
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theory; the perception and reality of underzealous representation 
continues to plague the world of indigent criminal defense.52 No 
discussion of zeal in lawyering would be complete without a look at 
the classic articulation in defense of zeal:  Lord Henry Brougham’s 
statement regarding his defense of Queen Caroline in 1820.53  Lord 
Brougham had evidence that, if presented publicly, would, at a 
minimum, embarrass King George IV and, at worst, could have led to 
the monarch being forced from the throne.54  Speaking before the 
House of Lords, Lord Brougham explained in no uncertain terms 
that, if the case against Queen Caroline went forward, he would be 
bound only to achieve the interests of his client, without regard for 
the consequences to king or to country: 
 [A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one 
person in all the world, and that person is his client.  To save that 
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to 
other persons, and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, 
the torments, the destruction which he may ring upon others.  
Separating the duty of the patriot from that of an advocate, he 
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.55
Lord Brougham’s statement is widely—although not universally56—
accepted today as an accurate articulation of the role of the lawyer 
within the American adversarial system of justice.57
 52. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 410 (1982) (“I have been accused 
several times of overzealousness.  I confess my guilt.  In a world full of underzealous, 
lazy, and incompetent defense lawyers, I am proud to be regarded as overzealous on 
behalf of my clients.”). 
 53. See Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING 
THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 18, 26 (Rodney Uphoff ed., 1995) (citing BROUGHAM, 
LIFE AND TIMES OF LORD BROUGHAM 405–07 (n.d.)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  The evidence to which Brougham was referring involved general gossip 
regarding King George IV’s “indiscretions,” but also specific evidence that the king 
had contracted a marriage with a Roman Catholic, a charge that, if proven, would 
have resulted in the king automatically being stripped of his crown.  WOLFRAM, supra 
note 45, at 580 n.82 (citing DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188–89 
(1973)). 
 56. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, How To Win the Trial of the Century:  The Ethics of 
Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 320–21 
(1998) (urging a retreat from Brougham-style zeal and a return to “civility, trust, and 
fair dealing”). 
 57. More than 150 years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court provided its own 
version of Lord Brougham’s defense of zeal.  Declining to pre-emptively enjoin an 
attorney’s anticipated breach of the Mississippi State Bar’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility, the court explored the principle of zeal in a modern context: 
A lawyer is and must be the ultimate advocate.  He speaks for and in the 
interest of his client . . . . And when his client is on the ropes, the lawyer, 
standing alone if need be, is that one person who, in the interest of his 
  
222 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:207 
                                                          
Zeal is a crucial component of client-centered representation and 
is at the heart of meaningful lawyering.  The client-centered 
approach promotes values of autonomy and dignity of the client and, 
therefore, of the system generally.58  The recognition of zeal as a 
paramount principle is especially pronounced in the criminal 
defense context, where the stakes are such that the lawyer for the 
accused must adopt her client’s cause as her own.59  The Model Rules, 
however, consign zeal to the preamble, and effectively subordinate it 
to the principle of candor.60
Any good criminal defense lawyer begins from a presumption of 
zealous representation.  Although sometimes criticized by scholars,61 
it is an article of faith among good defense lawyers—and 
client, skillfully defies the state, the opposing litigant, or whoever threatens.  
The lawyer is prepared to stand against the forces of hell though others see 
that as his client’s just desert.  He assures all adversaries, in the vernacular of 
the streets, “You may get my client but you’ve got to come through me first.” 
Thornton v. Breland, 441 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Miss. 1983).  As colorfully as Lord 
Brougham, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognizes the sanctity of the role of 
lawyer as zealous advocate and the unique nature of that relationship.  See id. at 1350 
(“We regard the lawyer’s right and responsibility of zealous advocacy on behalf of his 
client among the most precious forms of speech.”).  The question in Thornton was 
whether a court could enjoin the participation in a case of a lawyer who appeared to 
be in the process of violating one of the canons of that state bar’s canons of ethics, or 
whether the appropriate course of action was to wait until after the violation had 
occurred before imposing any discipline on the attorney.  See id. at 1348 (“In our 
view it is ordinarily inappropriate for this Court, or any other court of this state for 
that matter, to restrain or enjoin in advance threatened or anticipated violations of 
our Disciplinary Rules.”). 
 58. See Kruse, supra note 8, at 369 (explaining the tension between lawyer 
neutrality and methods of lawyering based on the basic tenants of client-centered 
representation, and further describing various “autonomy-enhancing 
intervention[s]” that aid lawyers in knowing how and when to intervene in the client 
decision-making process); Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications:  Seeking Motivations 
To Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1993) (arguing that the 
moral implications upon a criminal defense lawyer interfere with client autonomy 
when society holds the lawyer morally responsible in zealously advocating for the 
client’s goals; however, “‘autonomy and equality suggest that . . . the client’s 
conscience should be superior to the lawyer’s.’” (quoting Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role:  A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617–18)). 
 59. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1166 (noting the contentions between zeal 
and ethics in writing and codes of professional conduct); Monroe H. Freedman, In 
Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other 
Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 771 (2006) (arguing that zealous 
representation sometimes requires breaking disciplinary rules, but not unethically); 
Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003) (discussing the interaction of zealous advocacy with 
other fundamental principles of law, and arguing that the former should trump 
other rules and principles). 
 60. Indeed, the preamble to the rules states that “[a]s advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”  
MODERN RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002). 
 61. See Alschuler, supra note 56, at 320–21 (citing scholars’ declarations that 
zealous representation has changed the legal profession “for the worse”). 
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appropriately so—that in the service of her client, a defense lawyer 
must pursue any avenue available within the bounds of the law.  The 
zealous defense lawyer is bound to use any strategy not forbidden by 
law or ethics.62  The promise of zealous representation, as embodied 
by Lord Brougham,63 John Adams,64 and other defense attorneys, 
depends upon a commitment to the client above any other loyalty.65  
Moreover, this “pervasive ideal”66 has long been held to excuse the 
defense lawyer from other goals of the system, notably the search for 
truth and reliable outcomes at trial.  Justice White explained that 
truth and reliable outcomes cannot be the goals of the defense 
lawyer: 
 62. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS:  THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) (“What a defense attorney ‘may’ do, he must do, 
if it is necessary to defend his client.  A zealous defense attorney has a professional 
obligation to take every legal and ethically permissible step that will serve the client’s 
best interest—even if the attorney finds the step personally distasteful.”).  Abbe 
Smith has written extensively in defense of this notion of zeal and against the idea of 
the lawyer as having divided or conflicting loyalties.  See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Defending 
Defending:  The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 958 (2000) (arguing that an attorney has an obligation to do 
whatever possible to successfully defend her client, by doing what is best for the 
client, and not what is best for the lawyer or the community at large); Smith, supra 
note 45, at 1589–91 (arguing that criminal defense lawyers are protectors of 
individuals, not communities, and that favoring a softer approach to zealous 
advocacy disadvantages the poor, black, and imprisoned).  For a contrary position, 
see Anthony Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1995) 
(arguing against the practice of criminal defense lawyers using “racialized” defense 
theories on the grounds that the practice perpetuates racial stereotypes and arguing 
that criminal defense lawyers have a duty not only to their individual clients but to 
the communities to which those clients belong). 
 63. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (surveying the development of 
zealous advocacy as an ethical canon). 
 64. In 1770, future-President Adams agreed to represent the British soldiers 
accused of murdering colonists in what came to be known as the Boston Massacre.  
His representation of the British soldiers, in the environment of pre-revolutionary 
Boston, was seen by many as something approaching treason.  At trial, Adams won 
acquittals for the British officer and six of the eight soldiers who had been charged 
with murder.  For an account of Adams’s involvement in the case within the context 
of criminal defense ethics, see Smith, supra note 2, at 38–43 (describing the history of 
John Adams as both a patriot and a defender of individual rights and concluding 
that although his practice suffered as a result of his defense work for the British, he 
was eventually more respected for his integrity and advocacy).  See also DAVID 
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2001) (noting John Adams’s belief that “no man in a 
free country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial”). 
 65. See Uelmen, supra note 24, at 122 (“I would take this position a step beyond 
simply rejecting the suggestion that lawyers owe some higher duty to their country.  I 
would argue that it would be unethical for a lawyer who felt some higher duty to act 
upon it to the detriment of the client.”). 
 66. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 71–
127 (stating that zeal conditions all the other ethical obligations of an attorney by 
demanding entire devotion to the client’s best interests, and discussing zeal in the 
context of choosing clients, earning a living, moral limits, ethical rules, and the 
courtroom). 
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 [D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or present 
the truth.  Our system assigns him a different mission. . . . Defense 
counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is.  
He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any 
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help 
the prosecution’s case. . . . In this respect, . . . as part of the duty 
imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance 
or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, 
relation to the search for truth.67
If the defense lawyer is not engaged in a search for the truth, as the 
other actors in the criminal justice system are, in what sense can she 
be obligated to uphold the moral integrity of the proceedings?  
Fundamentally, it is through fulfilling her obligation of zealous 
representation that she can maintain the integrity and dignity of the 
process. 
C. The Obligation to Protect Confidences and Secrets 
For centuries, Anglo-American law has provided for both a 
privilege regarding confidential communications between attorney 
and client and a conceptually distinct, but related, principle that 
attorneys have a responsibility to protect the “confidences and 
secrets” of their clients.68  Roman law contained the basis for a 
privilege for confidential communications between lawyer and 
client.69  At least since the time of Elizabethan England, the principle 
 67. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part). 
 68. It is important to note the distinction between the attorney-client privilege 
and the much broader ethical requirement that the lawyer protect confidences and 
secrets obtained during the course of the representation.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (describing the instances when it is appropriate for an 
attorney to reveal information about her client, such as to prevent death or to 
comply with laws and court orders).  Whereas the privilege applies to private 
communications between lawyer and client, the confidentiality rule applies to those 
communications, as well as any other information relating to the representation, 
regardless of the source of the information or the manner in which the information 
was obtained, as long as the information, if revealed, could be detrimental or 
embarrassing to the client.  See id. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The confidentiality rule . . . applies 
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  A lawyer may not 
disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.”); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 131 (explaining the differences between 
“confidence” and “secrets,” the former referring to information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and the latter, information that, if disclosed, would be 
“embarrassing or detrimental to the client”); infra note 74 (noting the ethical 
obligation against disclosing confidential information applies even if the information 
is known by others). 
 69. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1928) (detailing the development of the attorney-client 
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of confidentiality—at least in broad contour—has been accepted 
without question in the English and American systems of justice.70  
Notwithstanding the regular critiques of the privileges as detracting 
from the search for truth in the legal system,71 both the “confidential 
communication” privilege and the protection against revealing 
“confidences and secrets” are firmly embedded in the legal system 
and are under no threat of extinction. 
The ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model 
Code”) discusses the need for a broad rule prohibiting the disclosure 
of client confidences and secrets by an attorney.72  “Both the fiduciary 
relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper 
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of 
confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to 
employ him.”73  A strict prohibition against disclosure of confidences 
and secrets, then, serves a broader purpose than simply aiding in an 
instrumental way a contractual or agency-based relationship; it is 
central to the integrity of the legal system.  Endorsing the view that 
the attorney-client relationship is a “sacred trust,” the Model Code 
recognizes that the ethical obligation of an attorney to guard against 
disclosure of client confidences and secrets is much broader than the 
attorney-client privilege74 and argues that public policy favors a very 
protective rule.75
privilege and the idea of confidentiality between the two, starting with the Roman 
law and the relationship between servant and master in that society, and noting how 
Roman law was a foundation for the English rule, although its precedent is not 
documented). 
 70. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T. 
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (charting the history of the attorney-client privilege 
back to the reign of Elizabeth I).  The improper revelation of client confidences or 
secrets was grounds for imprisonment by the fourteenth century in England.  See 
Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer:  Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Early 
Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 194–95 (2000) (explaining 
cases where the lawyer was disloyal fall generally into two types:  either the lawyer  
(1) uses the information to benefit himself or a third party or (2) discloses the 
information to the client’s adversary); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 1395–96 
(explaining that cases involving an attorney’s breach of client confidentiality were 
described as cases of deceit and disloyalty). 
 71. See, e.g.,  Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege 
Retained:  A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (1982) (discussing 
Judge Frankel’s proposal of a rule to require disclosure of all relevant information in 
civil litigation to avoid privilege disputes).  
 72. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983) (discussing the 
importance of a client to be able to openly discuss anything with her lawyer and the 
lawyer must also be able to use this trust to obtain information she needs to advocate 
on the client’s behalf). 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. See id. (“The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical 
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidence and secrets of his client.  This ethical 
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The obligation to protect confidences and secrets is clear, 
unambiguous, and mandatory:  the lawyer must protect those 
confidences and secrets obtained in the course of the representation, 
the revelation of which could prove detrimental or embarrassing to 
her client.  The clarity of this obligation stands in stark contrast to the 
more ethereal concepts of candor and zeal.  Although the duties of 
candor and zeal must inform the actions and decisions of the lawyer, 
the “confidences and secrets” requirement provides more concrete 
guidance.  By upholding its mandate, the defense lawyer fulfills both 
her obligation as an officer of the court and her obligation to provide 
zealous representation. 
II. DUSKY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  THE LAW OF COMPETENCY  
AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
No person can be required to stand trial unless that person is 
legally competent,76 and the conviction of a legally incompetent 
criminal defendant violates due process.77  The federal constitutional 
baseline for legal competency to stand trial in a criminal case was 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States:78  a 
criminal defendant is competent to stand trial only if that person 
precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or 
source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge.”). 
 75. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983); see also id. at EC 4-1 
n.1 (“To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not 
only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and 
prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance.”).  
Courts have also endorsed a broad prohibition against disclosure of client 
confidences and secrets because of the “peculiarly intimate relationship” existing 
between attorney and client.  Id. (quoting Ellis-Foster v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D.N.J. 1958)). 
 76. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (“[E]vidence of a defendant’s 
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on 
competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry [of 
a defendant’s competency to stand trial] is required.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 
375, 385 (1966) (holding that defendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent 
was violated when adequate procedures were not adhered to, depriving defendant’s 
due process right to a fair trial).  In the same way that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment forbids the trial of an incompetent defendant in a criminal case, 
the adjudication of an incompetent juvenile in a delinquency proceeding violates 
that child’s right to due process.  See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. 
1990) (holding that the procedures in place to ensure competency in an adult 
criminal trial apply equally to juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
 77. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 412 (1993) (noting that it is well 
established that “criminal prosecution of an incompetent defendant” violates due 
process); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (holding that the criminal 
trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process); Pate, 383 U.S. at 378 (stating 
that “conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due 
process.”). 
 78. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). 
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possesses both a factual and a rational understanding of the 
proceedings against her and has the present ability to consult with 
her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.79  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that this requirement that 
any defendant be competent to understand and assist in the 
proceedings is central to the American criminal justice system,80 and 
the prohibition against trying an incompetent accused is deeply 
embedded in common law.81  The reasons for the prohibition are 
premised both on the rights of the individual and, more broadly, on 
the moral integrity of the criminal justice system.82  A system that 
tolerates the trial of a person who is essentially defenseless and, 
perhaps, morally blameless cannot be said to have integrity; further, 
trial of such a person would offend deeply held social notions of the 
dignity of the individual.83
Dusky dealt specifically with the competency of a defendant to stand 
trial and left open the issue of how courts were to evaluate the 
competency of defendants to make other decisions or to waive 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (“The prohibition [against trying a criminal 
defendant who is mentally incompetent] is fundamental to an adversary system of 
justice.”); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) (describing cases from the 
eighteenth century in which court required juries to consider the competency of 
defendants); Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 (rejecting the argument of the government that 
the defendant had waived the issue of competence by failing to raise it, because such 
a failure could not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver). 
 81. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (noting that the common law competency 
requirement is necessary because a mentally incompetent defendant is “in reality 
afforded no opportunity to defend himself”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. The question of competency to stand trial is, of course, a separate analytical 
question from whether a defendant is criminally responsible for her actions.  A 
defendant may have a valid defense of diminished capacity or insanity and still be 
perfectly competent to stand trial and, conversely, a defendant may have been 
entirely lucid during the commission of an offense but later become incompetent, by 
reason of mental illness, injury, or disease.  The constitutional requirement that a 
criminal defendant be legally competent stands entirely apart from the question of 
availability of any “mental health” defenses that may mitigate criminal culpability.  
Blackstone wrote that: 
 [I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before 
arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, 
because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he 
ought.  And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not 
be tried; for how can he make his defence? 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24. 
 83. See Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 13, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (No. 00-6677), 
2001 WL 30662, at *13 (observing that “[c]ompetence to stand trial is a unique issue 
at the intersection of law and mental disability” and stating that preventing the trial 
of incompetent individuals provides important protections for both the defendant 
and court). 
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particular rights in connection with their cases.84  In Godinez v. 
Moran,85 the Supreme Court held that the standard for competency to 
stand trial is identical to the standard of competency to waive 
constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel and the right to 
trial.86  The extremely low standard of competency articulated in 
Dusky has become the sole test that courts use in determining 
whether a defendant is or is not competent to proceed in a criminal 
case.87  Criticisms of this unitary approach to competency were 
anticipated by Justice Blackmun, who argued in dissent that 
“[c]ompetency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to 
competency for another purpose.”88  Blackmun opposed the adoption 
of one unitary standard for competency and argued instead that the 
competency standard should vary depending on the particular 
question facing the putatively incompetent defendant.89  Since 
Godinez, the majority’s adoption of the “all or nothing” unitary 
standard has been widely criticized by practitioners, academics, and 
mental health professionals, as being overly simplistic and 
unworkable.90  Indeed, the Court recently retreated from the notion 
of a unitary standard of competency and held, in Indiana v. Edwards,91 
that a defendant who is competent to proceed to trial is not 
necessarily competent to waive counsel.92  Although the Edwards 
Court stopped short of repudiating the logic of Godinez, the decision 
refers approvingly to the existence of differing degrees of 
“adjudicative competence” and certainly seems to undercut the 
 84. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam); see Indiana v. 
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2380 (2008) (explaining that Dusky did not consider the 
relation of the mental competence standard to the self-representation right). 
 85. 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 86. Id. at 396–99. 
 87. Of course, Dusky and Godinez establish a federal constitutional minimum for 
determination of competency.  States remain free to require a showing of 
competency by a higher standard, which would be more protective of due process 
concerns.  Id. at 402. 
 88. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 89. See id. (arguing that Supreme Court cases have always recognized that a 
defendant’s mental condition may be relevant to more than one legal issue, each 
governed by distinct rules reflecting quite different policies) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND 
TESTIMONY 8–9 (2007) (discussing the MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study 
which found, inter alia, that defendants may be incompetent for one legal purpose 
but not for another); Sara Longtain, The Twilight of Competency and Mental Illness:  A 
Conciliatory Conception of Competency and Insanity, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1563, 1575–78 
(2007) (denoting that several scholars support splitting the determination of 
competency into two:  competence to assist counsel and decisional competence). 
 91. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008). 
 92. See id. at 2394 (holding only that lack of mental competence can, under some 
circumstances, form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se). 
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holding of Godinez.93  Both substantively and procedurally, the 
doctrine of competency in the criminal context is ripe for fresh 
theorizing and development. 
Procedurally, the question of which party bears the burden of 
proof on the question of competency varies based on jurisdiction 
and, in many jurisdictions, there is no clear answer.94  Because there is 
often no clear allocation of burden of proof95 and no clear 
 93. See id. at 2386 (explaining that within each domain of adjudicative 
competence—competence to assist counsel and decisional competence—the data 
indicate that understanding, reasoning, and appreciation of the charges against a 
defendant are separable and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal 
ability). 
 94. Compare Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Del. 2007) (asserting that the 
government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
regardless of whether the defendant is a juvenile or an adult), Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 872 N.E.2d 711, 722 (Mass. 2007) (stating that the government bears the 
burden of proving competency by a preponderance of the evidence), and State v. 
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (noting that under state rules of criminal 
procedure the government must show the defendant’s competency by a “fair 
preponderance of the evidence”), with Velazquez v. State, 655 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Ga. 
2008) (declaring that the defendant bears the burden of proving incompetency by a 
preponderance of the evidence), Ross v. State, 98-DP-01038-SCT (¶ 90) (Miss. 2007), 
954 So. 2d 968, 1007 (expressing that where there is a serious question about the 
sanity or competency of a defendant to stand trial, it naturally falls upon the 
defendant to go forward with the evidence to show her probable incapacity to make a 
rational defense), and Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 236 (Pa. 2007) 
(indicating that the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that she was incompetent to stand trial). 
 95. The federal statute dealing with the competency of criminal defendants does 
not explicitly allocate a burden of proof on the issue.  See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006) 
(allowing either the defendant or government attorney to file a motion for a 
competency hearing).  Notably, in Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Court, in dicta, cited this 
provision and stated:  “Congress has directed that the accused in a federal 
prosecution must prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”  517 
U.S. 348, 362 (1996).  This appears, however, to be a mistake, because nothing in the 
text of § 4241 allocates the burden in this manner, and the vast majority of federal 
cases construing the statute place the burden on the government, rather than on the 
accused.  Indeed, virtually every federal circuit to address the issue has construed the 
statute to place the burden of proof on the prosecution.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991) (asserting that the government has the 
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 
1987) (stating that the state must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the 
defendant was competent to stand trial); Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Corr. 
Facility, 682 F.2d 348, 349 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing cases supporting the view that once 
a defendant’s competency has been called into question, the burden rests on the 
prosecution to prove the defendant is competent to stand trial); United States v. 
Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[N]o burden of proof rests on a defendant 
to demonstrate his own incompetency.”); United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 906 
(5th Cir. 1976) (“There can be no question that in federal criminal cases the 
government has the burden of proving defendant competent to stand trial.”); United 
States v. Mason, 935 F. Supp. 745, 759–60 (W.D.N.C. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 701 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that the government has the burden of proof to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the defendant’s competency).  In addition, federal 
law explicitly places the burden on the accused to establish an insanity defense.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (asserting that the defendant has the burden of proving her 
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articulation of the standard of proof in this area,96 the opinion and 
arguments of the defendant’s own lawyer are often extremely 
significant in the determination of competency.  The most common 
approach (and the most sensible) is a burden-shifting mechanism by 
which the party placing competency in question bears the burden of 
production on the issue of competency, but the prosecution bears 
the burden of persuasion.97  In the typical case, then, the defendant 
will bear the burden of production,98 while the government bears the 
burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue.99
insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence).  The fact that Congress does not 
similarly allocate the burden of proof with regard to competency suggests that 
Congress did not intend to force the incompetent accused to bear such a burden. 
 96. In Cooper, the Court declined to articulate a bright-line rule regarding the 
appropriate standard of proof—or even to place the burden of proof squarely on the 
government.  517 U.S. at 348.  The Supreme Court recognized, however, the 
extraordinary interest that an incompetent accused has in not being tried.  Id. at 364 
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).  The Court reasoned:  “By 
comparison to the defendant’s interest [in not being forced to trial while 
incompetent], the injury to the State of the opposite error—a conclusion that the 
defendant is incompetent when he is in fact malingering—is modest.”  Id. at 365.  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s assessment of the relative potential injuries in 
such a proceeding, however, the Court has declined to fashion a rule that placed the 
burden of proof invariably with the prosecution.  States are free to place that burden 
on either the prosecution or the accused, subject to certain limitations, without 
violating due process.  See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449–52 (1992) (finding 
no violation of due process where the state legislature had statutorily imposed on the 
defendant the burden to prove her own incompetency by a preponderance of the 
evidence).  Due process does require that a defendant not be compelled to prove her 
incompetency by any standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Cooper, 517 U.S. at 358–62 (finding a violation of due process where the 
state’s statute created a presumption of competency and placed the burden on the 
accused to prove incompetency by clear and convincing evidence). 
 97. One can think of this burden-shifting scheme as beginning with a 
presumption of competency that is overcome by some evidence of incompetency. 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Riggin, 732 F. Supp. 958, 963 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (“On 
principles of fundamental fairness and due process, courts have appropriately 
refused to place the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant.  Thus the 
burden of proving competency . . . would implicitly fall on the government.”); see also 
Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986) (asserting that the prosecution must 
prove the defendant’s competence); People v. McCullum, 362 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ill. 
1977) (finding that it was not the defendant’s burden to prove fitness to stand trial 
when she was the one to initially raise the competency issue); Commonwealth v. 
L’Abbe, 656 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that the defendant claimed 
he was not competent to stand trial, thereby placing the burden on the 
Commonwealth to prove his competency); State v. Champagne, 497 A.2d 1242, 1245 
(N.H. 1985) (holding that, as a matter of law “the State . . . did not meet its burden 
of proving . . . that the defendant [had] the ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding”); State v. Chapman, 684 P.2d 1143, 
1144 (N.M. 1984) (deciding whether the court of appeals erroneously substituted its 
judgment for that of the jury in finding that the facts did not support the defendant’s 
competence); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1982) (“We agree with the 
majority of courts that the prosecution has the burden to establish a defendant’s 
capacity to stand trial.”); State v. Garfoot, 558 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Wis. 1997) 
(indicating that the defense attorney requested a competency hearing for his client); 
Engle v. State, 821 P.2d 1285, 1287–88 (Wyo. 1991) (“The party seeking to show 
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Placing the burden of proof on the government makes sense 
because of the well-settled and fundamental presumption against 
trying an incompetent person.100  It is preferable for courts to err on 
the side of competent defendants not being tried by means of a 
criminal trial (and rather treated, if appropriate, through means of 
civil commitment) than on the side of incompetent defendants, 
unable to understand the proceedings against them or to assist in 
their own defense, being forced to trial.  By placing the burden of 
proof on the government, courts prevent the obvious unfairness of 
calling upon an accused to somehow prove his competency, which is 
the very thing that is genuinely in question.101
But for all this talk of competency, what does it require?  In Riggins 
v. Nevada,102 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, described 
competency as follows: 
 Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends 
the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, 
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to 
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the 
right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without 
penalty for doing so.103
Obviously, the competency vel non of a defendant is not fixed for 
all time once a determination is made.104  Defendants can become 
competence to stand trial has the burden to show it . . . . Thus, the State had the 
burden of proof at the competency hearing.”) (internal citation omitted).   
 99. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Brown v. 
Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, set out this standard clearly: 
In the absence of any indications to the contrary, a defendant charged with 
criminal behavior is presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial.  
However, once a defendant’s competency has been called into question, 
either by the defendant or the prosecution expressly raising the issue, or 
through the presence of “warning signals” which cause the court to raise the 
question sua sponte, the burden is placed on the prosecution to prove that 
the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial. 
682 F.2d 348, 349 (2d Cir. 1982).  To say that there is initially a “presumption of 
competency” is only to say that, in the ordinary case, the trial of the person charged 
with a crime will follow in the normal course of events.  Only if there is some reason 
to doubt the competency of the accused, then does it become an issue.  See United 
States v. DiGillo, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that evidence showing 
competency must be more persuasive that that showing incompetency which 
necessitates that the burden of proof cannot be placed on the defendant). 
 100. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 353. 
 101. See Riggin, 732 F. Supp. at 963 (citing DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 972) (listing 
principles of fundamental fairness and due process as the key reasons for refusing to 
place the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant). 
 102. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 103. Id. at 139–40 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1975)). 
 104. See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2386 (2008) (“Mental illness itself is 
not a unitary concept.  It varies in degree.  It can vary over time.  It interferes with an 
individual’s functioning at different times in different ways.”). 
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competent to stand trial after having been found incompetent, and 
the opposite can occur as well.  Due process requires that an accused 
must be competent at all stages of the proceedings against her.105  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in Godinez, 
competency—as a logical matter—is much more than simply 
competency to stand trial.  A defendant must, for example, possess a 
rational and a factual understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of pleading guilty, of choosing between a jury trial and 
a bench trial, or of choosing between different defense theories. 
Depending on the circumstances of the case, this understanding may 
require a higher level of sophistication than an understanding of the 
trial process itself. 
Complicating the issue of competency is the level of complexity of 
charges the defendant is facing.  The ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards state that any evaluation of competency must 
consider, inter alia, whether the accused’s ability to understand the 
process is proportional to the relative complexity and severity of the 
case.106  If this is true, then the same person at the same mental stage 
might be competent to proceed to trial in a drug possession case but 
be incompetent to stand trial in a complex conspiracy case, for 
example.  Dusky seems to anticipate this “sliding scale” of competency 
by focusing on the defendant’s ability to possess a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding of the proceedings against her, suggesting 
that the standard for competency could vary based upon the nature 
of the proceedings the defendant faces.107  Approaching “decisional 
competency” as the ability to make a rational choice on a particular 
 105. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24 (stating that a defendant must 
be competent throughout all phases of the criminal process such that, if the 
defendant “loses his senses” after conviction but before judgment is entered, 
judgment will be stayed; or if the defendant becomes incompetent after judgment 
but prior to its execution, then execution of the judgment will be stayed); see also 
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:  A HANDBOOK 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 126–27 (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the 
common law roots of the principle that an accused must be competent throughout 
every part of the court proceedings against him). 
 106. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.1, 7-152, 7-154 (1989); see 
Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants:  Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 548 (1993) (distinguishing between competency to proceed 
and “decisional competency”). 
 107. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam) 
(agreeing that the test for competence is whether the defendant has “sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him”). 
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question in furtherance of a defense strategy is more nuanced and 
useful than the unitary approach of Godinez.108
The traditional Dusky competency test calls for far too narrow an 
inquiry into the mental capacity of the accused and, accordingly, 
allows defendants who lack the ability to meaningfully assist in their 
own defense to be put on trial.109  A meaningful alternative test would 
focus more broadly on the critical faculties of the accused—i.e., the 
ability of the accused to exercise “basic rationality and self-regard.”110  
To be considered competent, according to this broader and more 
meaningful inquiry, a criminal defendant would have to possess:   
(1) a rudimentary understanding of the criminal process; (2) the 
ability to give non-delusional reasons for making the proposed 
decision; and (3) sufficient self-regard to consider alternative 
reasons.111  This proposal is an improvement over the Dusky test 
because it allows for a more nuanced understanding of competency 
and allows for an understanding of different levels of decisional 
competency.  The “basic rationality and self-regard” test draws heavily 
on Bonnie’s concept of “decisional competency.”112  Either proposal 
would constitute a significantly higher—and more accurate—
standard of determining competency of a criminal defendant to 
meaningfully take part in her own defense. 
III. ETHICAL GUIDANCE IN DEFENDING A MENTALLY IMPAIRED CLIENT 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not helpful in 
guiding a criminal defense lawyer representing a client with mental 
 108. Richard Bonnie divides the competency inquiry into two parts:  competency 
to assist counsel and decisional competency.  Bonnie, supra note 106, at 548.  While 
he posits the ability to assist counsel as a “foundational requirement” to adjudication, 
he argues that decisional competency is a “contextualized concept,” that should be 
assessed in the context of the decisions, if any, that a defendant is called upon to 
make during the course of a trial or a case.  Id.  One of the “cognitive tasks” that 
Bonnie believes is a necessary component of “decisional competency” is the ability 
“to understand and choose among alternative courses of action.”  Id. at 556. 
 109. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s 
Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581, 1590–94 
(2000). 
 110. See id. at 1584 (explaining that this test is probably more demanding than the 
Supreme Court’s test but significantly less stringent than some lower courts). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Bonnie, supra note 106, at 555 (characterizing “decisional competence” as 
independently significant if and only if defendant is competent to assist counsel; as 
required only when a decision must be made by the defendant; promoting interest in 
autonomous decision-making by defendant; as understanding that the abilities 
required, and legal test, vary according to decision-making; and as incompetence not 
precluding adjudication).   
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impairment.113  Rule 1.14, entitled “Client with Diminished Capacity,” 
offers no substantive guidance to the lawyer other than to maintain 
that “as far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer 
relationship with the client.”114  The Rule goes on to provide for the 
taking of “reasonably necessary protective action” to prevent harm to 
a client, including consultation with others who “have the ability to 
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.”115  
Finally, the Rule deals with the intersection of the lawyer’s duty to 
protect client confidences and secrets, and the lawyer’s duty to 
protect a client with diminished capacity.  While acknowledging that 
the rule against disclosure of confidential information applies to 
information relating to the representation of a client with diminished 
capacity, the Rule qualifies this by clarifying that the lawyer is 
impliedly authorized to reveal information about a client with 
diminished capacity, “but only to the extent reasonably necessary to 
protect the client’s interests.”116
Model Rule 1.14 and its comments implicitly recognize the conflict 
between autonomy and paternalism.  Comment 8 recognizes that a 
lawyer’s raising of the issue of diminished capacity could lead to her 
client being involuntary committed:  “The lawyer’s position in such 
cases is an unavoidably difficult one.”117  Comment 6 notes that “the 
lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.”118  
Apart from recognizing the “unavoidably difficult” position of the 
lawyer in such a situation, however, the Model Rules provide no real 
help to the lawyer struggling with this issue.119
Most commentators place upon the defense attorney an obligation 
to raise the issue of competency of the defendant any time that the 
attorney believes that his client may not be competent.120  Such an 
 113. See Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client:  What the Model 
Rules Say and Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 242 (1998) (“[N]one of the rules 
and authorities give the lawyer adequate guidance for assessing capacity or deciding 
how to proceed if doubts exist.  Some rules are Delphic at best.  The Model Rules 
place burdens on lawyers, but neglect to say how the attorney can meet those 
burdens without violating other mandatory rules of professional conduct.”). 
 114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2002). 
 115. Id. at 1.14(b). 
 116. Id. at 1.14(c). 
 117. Id. at 1.14 cmt. 8. 
 118. Id. at 1.14 cmt. 6. 
 119. See supra notes 20, 113 (commenting on the lack of meaningful guidance 
offered by existing ethical codes with respect to attorneys representing mentally 
impaired clients). 
 120. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989) (prescribing 
that when defense counsel has a good-faith doubt about her client’s competency, she 
should move for a competency evaluation, even if the client objects to such a 
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approach is not justified by history, necessity, or logic and 
undermines the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and, 
therefore, the integrity of the criminal justice system.  Standard  
7-4.2(c) of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards states: 
 Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good 
faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence.  If the client objects 
to such a motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation 
over the client’s objection.  In any event, counsel should make 
known to the court and to the prosecutor those facts known to 
counsel which raise the good faith doubt of competence. 121
This proposal is outrageous for three reasons.  First, it eradicates 
the role of the attorney as advocate for his or her client, in that it 
appears to require the attorney to raise the issue of competency 
without any regard for the potentially disastrous consequences for 
her client.  Second, it obligates the attorney not only to advise the 
court of the potential issue of competency, but also to advise the 
prosecutor of her concerns.  Finally, it requires defense counsel to 
reveal not only her good-faith doubt about her client’s competency 
but also the facts that underlie that belief.  Such a proposal 
contravenes the ethical requirement that a defense attorney zealously 
represent her client and that the defense attorney protect client 
confidences and secrets.  Nevertheless, this standard has been 
substantially adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,122 the 
Wyoming Supreme Court,123 the Washington Supreme Court,124 as 
well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.125  
motion); see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental 
Retardation To Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 419–
20 (1990) (explaining that the obligation of the trial judge to hold a competency 
hearing arises at all stages of the proceeding and whether or not the defense has 
requested one); James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the 
Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 532 (1998) (contrasting that 
while a defense attorney is required to alert the court of the possibility that her 
defendant is incompetent, ethical rules do not allow her to disclose that information 
if the attorney received it in confidence). 
 121. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989). 
 122. See State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Wis. 1986) (holding that where 
defense counsel has reason to doubt her client’s competency, she is obligated to raise 
the issue with the trial court). 
 123. See DeShazer v. State, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003) (observing that 
Wyoming law is in accordance with the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health 
Standard 7-4.2). 
 124. See In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610, 611 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel knew there was an expert opinion that 
the defendant was incompetent to stand trial but failed to raise the issue at any point 
during the proceedings). 
 125. See United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that when a lawyer has reason to believe that her client may not be mentally 
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The scholarship on the ethics of criminal defense routinely cites this 
“obligation” as though it were uncontroversial.126
The commentary to Standard 7-4.2 addresses the “apparent 
conflict” that can befall a defense lawyer representing a potentially 
incompetent client “between the obligations . . . (1) effectively to 
represent a client’s best interests and (2) to reflect candor toward the 
tribunal.”127  The commentary recognizes the various situations in 
which the defense counsel’s decision to raise the spectre of 
incompetency could harm the potentially incompetent client but 
indicates that the risk of negative outcomes in such situations is 
outweighed by the need to maintain the integrity of the proceedings 
as well as due process concerns.128  Ultimately, the commentary makes 
explicit what the Standard suggests:  that in situations involving a 
potentially incompetent client, the defense lawyer’s duty of zealous 
advocacy must yield to the defense lawyer’s duty of candor toward the 
tribunal.  The commentary reads:  “Standard 7-4.2(c) recommends a 
clear requirement that defense counsel raise the issue of a 
defendant’s present mental incompetency whenever counsel has a 
good faith doubt about competence.  It resolves the difficult conflict 
of concerns inherent in such circumstances . . . in favor of counsel’s 
obligation to the court.”129
The additional guidance provided by the commentary to defense 
counsel will certainly be of cold comfort to the individual defendants 
competent to stand trial, she does not render ineffective assistance of counsel by 
making her concerns known to the court). 
 126. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 119 (arguing that the attorney 
has an ethical obligation to ensure the client receives treatment to restore 
competency, even if that obligation requires raising the incompetency issue in 
court). 
 127. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) cmt. (1989).  Of 
course, the defense lawyer is under no obligation to represent the client’s “best 
interests,” but, rather, the client’s stated desires. 
 128. Id.; Norma Schrock, Defense Counsel’s Role in Determining Competency To Stand 
Trial, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639, 639 (1996).  Schrock proposes that all attorneys be 
required to present to the court any reasonable doubts of a criminal defendant’s 
competency and that defense attorneys could testify at competency hearings, even if 
testifying is against her client’s wishes.  Id. at 655, 663.  Schrock’s proposal would 
deprive the defense lawyer of any discretion when representing a marginally 
competent client, regardless of the seriousness of the charge or the actual 
consequences to the client of a finding of incompetency.  Her proposal is based on a 
neat distinction between the “moral judgment of the criminal trial” on the one hand 
and the “protective intervention in lives of the mentally ill” on the other hand.  Id. at 
664.  What her proposal fails to account for, however, is the real-world manifestation 
of a finding of incompetency.  Although her proposal is premised on a defense of 
personal autonomy, its actual result could well have the exact opposite effect, 
depriving marginally competent defendants—or those acting on their behalf—of the 
ability to choose between different courses of action, and different consequences. 
 129. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) cmt. (1989). 
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being harmed by their lawyers’ compliance with Standard 7-4.2(c).  
The commentary advises that if compliance with the requirement of 
notifying the court to a good-faith doubt about a client’s competency 
would cause harm to that client, counsel should work to reform the 
system so that future similar defendants will not face such a dilemma: 
 The conflict, if it exists, arises from a perceived pragmatic failure 
of the criminal justice system to live up to its promise, in that the 
deficiencies in the system of incompetence evaluation and 
treatment implicitly threaten excessive or inappropriate sanctions 
against defendants.  The standard takes the position that, if such 
problems exist, the thrust should be to correct the problems not to 
permit a pragmatic but philosophically unsound mechanism to 
avoid them.  If elements of unfairness are eliminated from the 
system, defendants will have little reason to prefer a pragmatic 
avoidance of the competence issue in favor of trial on the merits.130
No mention is made in the commentary about how the individual 
defendant or lawyer is to achieve such systemic reform, or what the 
defendant should do while awaiting such reform. 
An example of the harm that can be done by a lawyer adhering to 
the advice of Standard 7-4.2(c) can be seen in the case of O’Beirne v. 
Overholser.131  Herbert O’Beirne faced a charge of petty larceny, in the 
Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, for stealing three 
watches and two rings valued at less than one-hundred dollars.132  The 
maximum penalty for petty larceny at the time of O’Beirne’s case was 
a term of imprisonment for one year.133  O’Beirne’s lawyer 
“interjected the issue of insanity” prior to trial and succeeded in 
having his client found not guilty by reason of insanity.134  In what can 
only be described as a “lawyer’s victory,” O’Beirne was then 
committed to the local mental hospital, St. Elizabeths, for an 
indefinite term.135  Almost four years later, O’Beirne—still 
 130. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 131. 193 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1961).  O’Beirne predates the promulgation of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards. 
 132. Id. at 657. 
 133. Id. at 654. 
 134. Id.  Procedurally, the case was somewhat more complicated.  O’Beirne had 
initially entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petty larceny and received a one year 
sentence.  Id. at 657.  Through counsel, he then successfully moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea and vacate the judgment against him.  Id.  Upon his withdrawal of the 
guilty plea, O’Beirne remained incarcerated but in a pre-trial posture, and was 
moved between St. Elizabeths Hospital, the District of Columbia Jail, and the 
psychiatric ward of the District of Columbia General Hospital.  Id.  Only after almost 
a year of mental examinations and pre-trial detention was O’Beirne finally brought 
to trial, in which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity.  Id. at 658. 
 135. Id. at 657. 
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involuntarily confined at St. Elizabeths—filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, seeking his release from the mental hospital.136  In 
granting his petition—a decision that was later reversed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit137—the district judge criticized the lawyer’s decision to raise 
the issue of his client’s mental health: 
 It may not be inappropriate to observe that counsel for 
defendants in borderline cases in which the offense is of a type that 
would carry at most a short term of imprisonment, frequently do 
their clients a disservice when they request a mental examination.  
Often the outcome of the examination is that the defendant is 
found competent and yet he will have been incarcerated for several 
months in the criminal ward of a mental hospital amidst madmen 
while the study of his mental state is being conducted; and if he is 
eventually convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, his 
incarceration is prolonged that much longer.  On the other hand, 
if he is acquitted on the ground of insanity, he runs the risk of 
being incarcerated for a much longer period than might have been 
the case if he were sentenced to a short term in jail.  Counsel for 
defendants are advocates and must have the courage to represent 
their clients’ best interests within the orbit of ethical practice.  
They must not be deterred by fear of criticism if they would act 
according to the highest traditions of the bar.  It is not their 
function to vindicate the public interest.  This is the duty of the 
[prosecutor], whose position is not that of a partisan advocate. . . . 
Mental examinations and the defense of insanity are better 
reserved for capital cases, as well as for cases in which the 
defendant runs the risk of being sentenced to imprisonment for a 
long term.138
The observations of the district judge in O’Beirne are unremarkable 
to any lawyer who has wrestled with the consequences of choosing 
whether to raise the issue of competency. 
As a practical matter, this decision is one like any other of the 
myriad of strategic decisions that defense counsel must make and 
involves the same considerations:  do the potential benefits from this 
proposed move outweigh the potential harm to my client, and what 
 136. Id. at 654. 
 137. See Overholser v. O’Beirne, 302 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).  In a fact-intensive 
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that O’Beirne failed to present sufficient evidence that he 
would not be dangerous in the future if released from the mental hospital. 
 138. O’Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 
302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
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are the relative likelihoods of both the benefit and the harm?139  What 
is absent from the O’Beirne opinion—and from some of the more 
“practical” advice on the issue—is an attempt to harmonize or 
reconcile this pragmatic approach with the attorney’s ethical duty of 
candor toward the tribunal.  As this Article demonstrates, an attorney 
who takes the advice of the judge in O’Beirne—that is, the attorney 
who makes her decision based on a reasoned analysis of the benefits 
and detriments and of how her decisions will actually affect her 
client—is acting not only as a zealous advocate for her client but also 
in an entirely professional and ethical manner. 
The duty of the defense attorney representing a mentally impaired 
client cannot be as simple as Standard 7-4.2(c) proposes.  The 
potentially disastrous consequences that flow from a finding of 
incompetency to stand trial—or, sometimes, from a defendant’s mere 
involvement in the evaluation process—must be taken into account 
when the defense attorney is weighing which course of action to take.  
If, for example, the defendant is charged with a very minor offense 
for which the maximum term of incarceration is short, the defense 
attorney’s acquiescence to or assistance in having her client 
institutionalized for incompetency would, in most cases, be 
unacceptable, and incompatible with the historical understanding of 
the defense lawyer as a partisan.140  In this scenario, the lawyer finds 
 139. See ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 
311 (5th ed. 1988).  Professor Amsterdam cautions defense counsel on the potential 
negative consequences of raising doubts about client competency, and advises 
against doing so unless it is in the client’s interest: 
 “[T]he interjection of psychiatric issues into any criminal case involves 
substantial dangers that may offset its contemplated benefits.  Its possibly 
harmful consequences to the defendant should caution counsel ordinarily 
not to bring psychiatric inquiries to the attention of the prosecution and the 
court unless the charges against the defendant are serious ones, carrying 
heavy penalties, and the prosecutor’s evidence of guilt appears strong.” 
Id.  Professor Amsterdam approaches the issue from a purely pragmatic angle—as a 
question of strategy—and does not address the existence vel non of an ethical 
obligation to raise the issue of competency.  Professor Amsterdam’s advice is directly 
contrary to the relevant ABA Standard, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 
7-4.2(c) (1989), and is a far preferable approach. 
 140. The analysis, however, is never easy.  An argument can be made that a 
lawyer’s duty to her client extends beyond the specific case in which the lawyer is 
involved; if the client would benefit from treatment, would the defense lawyer fulfill 
her role as zealous advocate for getting her that treatment, even if it must happen 
within the structures of the criminal justice system?  In Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best 
Interests:  The Defense Lawyer’s Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek To Control Their 
Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343 (1997–1998), author Josephine Ross describes her 
decision to raise the issue of her client’s competency in such a situation, guided by 
what she terms an “ethic of care.”  Id. at 1346.  Although Ross thoughtfully defends 
her approach and her decision in that case, the “ethic of care” is too broad a 
principle to meaningfully guide the discretion of well-intentioned lawyers and invites 
the lawyer to meddle too much in her client’s life.  Ross does address the breadth of 
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herself utterly unable to fulfill her ethical obligation zealously to 
represent her client and, indeed, is uniquely positioned to harm her 
client precisely because of the attorney-client relationship. 
If no absolute rule can govern what defense counsel is to do when 
representing a mentally impaired (and possibly incompetent) client, 
how is the attorney to be guided in deciding what to do?  The 
American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct drafted by the American Trial 
Lawyers Association, provides: 
 Once a lawyer is committed to represent a client . . . the lawyer 
has no discretion, short of withdrawal, to fail to provide the client 
with every legal recourse that is . . . in the client’s interests as the 
client perceives them.  When there is inadequate opportunity for 
consultation regarding the client’s interests, the lawyer shall act in 
accordance with the lawyer’s reasonable belief as to what the client 
would perceive to be in the client’s interest.141
This approach, though providing less clarity than that proposed by 
the ABA, provides more realistic and useful guidance on how a 
defense attorney should fulfill her ethical obligation to a client with 
whom she is unable to fully communicate.  As with the example of a 
person accused of a minor offense, for which she faces the prospect 
of little or no incarceration if convicted, the conscientious defense 
lawyer should evaluate strategically how the client would perceive her 
own interest if the client were able.  This approach, while trusting 
much power to the individual defense lawyer, favors the real-world 
consequences to the individual client over the formalistic adherence 
to principles of due process that are embodied in the ABA proposal. 
The position that a defense lawyer’s primary obligation is to her 
client’s interests, as opposed to the integrity of the tribunal or to the 
purely formalistic vindication of her client’s rights, is embodied in 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which 
provides: 
 A lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity . . . and 
for whom no guardian or other representative is available to act, 
must, with respect to a matter within the scope of the 
representation, pursue the lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s 
objectives or interests as the client would define them if able to 
the approach, cautioning that “[a]ny time a lawyer considers using substituted 
judgment, some soul searching is required on the part of the lawyer.”  Id. at 1372. 
 141. THE AMERICAN LAWYER’S CODE OF CONDUCT, ch. 3, cmt., reprinted in JOHN M. 
BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS app. C (rev. ed. 2001). 
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make adequately considered decisions on the matter, even if the 
client expresses no wishes or gives contrary instructions.142
Just as the ABA’s approach is remarkably restrictive in allowing the 
defense attorney to use discretion in pursuing what she perceives 
would be in her mentally impaired client’s interest, the Restatement 
is remarkably broad.  Not only may a defense lawyer employ her own 
judgment in the absence of direction from her client, under the 
Restatement, she may actually substitute her judgment for that of her 
mentally impaired client.  The comment to section 24 of the 
Restatement more explicitly contradicts the ABA Standard discussed 
above regarding a defense lawyer’s obligation vel non of bringing her 
client’s diminished capacity to the attention of the court.143  Indeed, 
the comment uses discretionary rather than mandatory language in 
describing a lawyer’s role in this regard:  “A lawyer may bring the 
client’s diminished capacity before a tribunal when doing so is 
reasonably calculated to advance the client’s objectives or interests as 
the client would define them if able to do so rationally.”144  The more 
nuanced approach of the Restatement allows a conscientious defense 
lawyer to avoid causing harm to her client and to make a decision 
based on a broader understanding of what is in the client’s best 
interests—or, more accurately, what the client would have wanted if 
not for the mental impairment. 
The issue of whether defense counsel has an ethical obligation to 
inform the court of her doubts regarding her client’s competency to 
be tried has not been the sole domain of scholars and writers of 
ethical codes; courts have weighed in as well, though less frequently 
than one might guess.145  Almost uniformly, courts that have 
considered the question have come down on the side of candor as 
opposed to zeal.146  This orientation is not surprising, given that the 
judges have an institutional interest in being as fully informed as 
possible about the defendants they face and that the judicial 
perspective generally may over-value the procedural principle of the 
 142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (2000).  The 
Restatement also provides that a lawyer representing a client with diminished 
capacity “may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action,” 
but only if doing so “will advance the client’s objectives or interests” as the client 
would define them if able to make adequately considered decisions.  Id. § 24(4). 
 143. Id. § 24 cmt. d. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally O’Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C.), rev’d on 
other grounds, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (opining on legal strategy for counsel 
representing defendants in borderline cases). 
 146. See infra notes 148–164, 166–171 and accompanying text (discussing two cases 
in which candor prevailed over zeal). 
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“integrity of the system” and under-value principles of advocacy, zeal, 
and substantive result.147
In In re Fleming,148 the Washington Supreme Court dealt with this 
issue and concluded that defense counsel’s failure to raise his doubts 
about his client’s competency constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.149  While delusional, Fleming armed himself with a gun and 
forced his way into a neighbor’s house, where he was shot in the 
stomach by the homeowner and then arrested.150  Fleming was 
charged with a litany of offenses, including first-degree burglary and 
unlawful possession of a firearm.151
Early in the proceedings, his lawyer obtained a psychological 
evaluation of Fleming, in which the examiner concluded that he was 
“marginally competent” to stand trial.152  Several months later, 
Fleming’s new attorney153 obtained a separate psychological 
evaluation from another psychologist, who concluded that Fleming 
was “unable to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in 
presenting a defense and is not able to prepare and conduct his own 
defense in a rational manner without counsel and therefore is judged 
presently mentally incompetent to stand trial.”154  Neither counsel ever 
showed either of these evaluations to the trial judge or the 
prosecutor, and no mention was ever made of the concerns about 
Fleming’s competency until after he had entered a plea of guilty.155
 147. Courts that have considered the issue are not, by any means, uniform in their 
conclusions.  Compare Enriquez v. Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the trial counsel’s failure to raise the competency issue was a 
“reasonable tactical decision” where petitioner claimed counsel had been ineffective 
for not raising concerns of incompetency prior to trial on first-degree murder), with 
Overholser v. O’Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (reversing decision of 
lower court, asserting that the judge in the lower court failed to even consider the 
question of competency raised by the defendant, nor did the defendant’s counsel 
properly raise the issue). 
 148. 16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2001) (en banc). 
 149. Id. at 616–17. 
 150. Id. at 612–13. 
 151. Id. at 612. 
 152. See id. (adding that Fleming had been psychotic at the time of the incident in 
question and that he had been “unable to distinguish right from wrong and [had 
been] incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his conduct due to his 
paranoid and borderline personality characteristics, as well as his amphetamine 
psychosis”). 
 153. See id. (noting that Fleming’s first attorney withdrew from the case due to her 
inability to communicate with Fleming). 
 154. Id. at 612–13. 
 155. See id. at 615.  Although no mention was specifically made regarding doubts 
about Fleming’s competency, his second counsel did give notice that he would be 
relying at trial on a diminished capacity defense.  Id. at 858–59.  Notwithstanding this 
red flag having to do with Fleming’s mental capacity (and the fact that two separate 
lawyers had separately petitioned the judge for funds to obtain psychological 
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Fleming entered an Alford plea156 to three of the charges against 
him pursuant to a plea bargain.157  Fleming attempted unsuccessfully 
to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing and then unsuccessfully 
appealed his conviction.158  At no time throughout the proceedings 
did either of Fleming’s lawyers raise any doubts about their client’s 
competency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea, and no mention 
was ever made of the two psychologists’ reports.159
Fleming then filed a petition for state post-conviction relief, 
arguing that he had been incompetent to enter a plea of guilty.160  
When he appealed the denial of his petition, the Washington 
Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court for failing to conduct a competency hearing because the judge 
had not been apprised of any doubts or concerns regarding 
Fleming’s competency to stand trial or to plead guilty.161  Troubled by 
the course of the proceedings, however, the court found that 
Fleming’s plea was invalid because his lawyers had failed to provide 
effective assistance of counsel.162  While acknowledging the 
government’s arguments that defense counsel’s failure to raise the 
issue of competency or to raise their doubts about Fleming’s 
competency a strategic decision, the court issued a blanket ruling 
that, as a matter of law, such a tactic—if that is what it was—does not 
fall within the bounds of effective assistance of counsel.163  The court 
concluded broadly and categorically:  “When defense counsel knows 
or has reason to know of a defendant’s incompetency, tactics cannot 
excuse failure to raise competency at any time so long as such 
incapacity continues.”164
The Fleming court, however, made no effort to justify or even to 
explain its conclusion that the failure to raise doubts about 
competency can never be an acceptable strategy in defense of a 
client.  One wonders if a harder case would have produced a 
evaluations), the trial judge apparently conducted no inquiry into Fleming’s 
competency prior to accepting his plea. 
 156. In North Carolina v. Alford, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant 
may plead guilty without actually admitting guilt, as long as the decision to plead 
guilty is a knowing, voluntary, and understanding choice from among the options 
available to the defendant.  400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
 157. Fleming, 16 P.3d at 613. 
 158. Id. at 613–14. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  The procedural vehicle by which Fleming sought state post-conviction 
relief is called a personal restraint petition, or a PRP. 
 161. Id. at 615. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 616–17. 
 164. Id. at 617 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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different result:  a defendant charged, not with a litany of serious 
offenses, but with one count of shoplifting, for which little or no jail 
time would result from a conviction.  The Fleming decision, 
frustratingly devoid of analysis or discussion of the sometimes 
competing obligations of the criminal defense attorney, is cited for 
the proposition that a defense attorney must always raise the issue of 
competency if she has any doubts about whether her client is 
competent to proceed.165  The case is an example of the summary and 
uncritical fashion in which courts deal with the conflict between a 
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and as a zealous advocate for 
her client. 
Other courts have referred uncritically to defense attorneys’ 
“obligation” to raise the issue of competency if counsel has good-faith 
doubts.  In United States v. Jackson,166 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit made reference to this issue in its 
consideration of whether the trial court erred in granting a 
competency evaluation at the request of defense counsel.167  In 
affirming the decision of the trial court to grant a competency 
evaluation (and applauding the defense lawyer for raising the issue), 
the Sixth Circuit stated that the defense lawyer “was discharging his 
‘professional duty’ as an officer of the court to raise the issue if 
counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence.”168  
Similarly, in State v. Johnson,169 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
an attorney has an affirmative obligation to raise the competency 
issue, stating in a conclusory fashion “that considerations of strategy 
are inappropriate in mental competency situations.”170  Other courts 
that have applied this mandatory disclosure obligation to defense 
 165. See, e.g., Duty To Alert Court of Client’s Mental Problems, 8 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE No. 
4, at 25, 25 (2007) (providing background on how different jurisdictions deal with 
the ethical problems surrounding disclosure of client competency).  
 166. 2006 FED App. 0312N, 179 F. App’x 921 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). 
 167. Id. at 19–20, 179 F. App’x at 933. 
 168. Id. at 19, 179 F. App’x at 933. 
 169. 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986). 
 170. Id. at 183.  Interestingly, seventeen years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
held that an attorney’s testimony at a competency hearing about her “opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions” of her client’s mental competency fell within the 
definition of a confidential communication and, therefore, violated the client’s 
statutory right to prevent her lawyer from disclosing those communications.  State v. 
Meeks, 2003 WI 104, ¶¶ 43–46, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶¶ 43–46, 666 N.W.2d 859, ¶¶ 43–
46.  Despite the Meeks court’s attempt to reconcile the two decisions, and despite the 
Meeks court’s protestations to the contrary, it appears to be a retreat from the Johnson 
rule, or at least a significant limitation of that rule. 
  
2008] CANDOR, ZEAL, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT 245 
                                                          
attorneys have done so without either analytical or precedential 
argument.171
The different approaches proposed by commentators and courts to 
address the problem of zealously representing a mentally impaired 
client can form a continuum from vindication of formal rights to 
pragmatic assistance of a client.  The formalistic approach of the 
ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards provides clarity and 
is founded upon a belief that criminal defendants generally are best 
served by an absolute prohibition on the trial of incompetent 
defendants and the concomitant vindication of those clients’ right to 
due process and fundamental fairness.  On a systemic level, this 
approach might make sense; similarly, under this approach, the 
privileging of the defense lawyer’s obligation to the tribunal as an 
officer of the court above the lawyer’s obligation to zealously 
represent his client is explained by the focus on systemic integrity. 
Because, arguably, a lawyer owes some duty—albeit nebulous and ill-
defined—to the proper functioning of the legal system, it would be 
an abdication of the lawyer’s role as officer of the court not to bring 
such information to the attention of the judge.  All of this, however, 
would be difficult to explain to that single client who has been 
confined for months or years in a mental hospital awaiting trial on a 
minor offense, having been found incompetent after his own lawyer 
raised the issue of competency before the court. 
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE:  TWO REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES 
In an effort to explore both the theoretical soundness and the 
practicality of various theories of what the defense lawyer is obligated 
(and allowed) to do when faced with the difficult job of representing 
a mentally impaired client, I offer two cases that I handled as a 
criminal defense lawyer.  Testing theory through the crucible of 
practice leads necessarily to both a more nuanced theory and more 
useful guidance.172  One of the limitations of the existing scholarship 
 171. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 252 P.2d 922, 923 (Kan. 1953) (referring to the state’s 
“well-settled rule . . . that whenever counsel for the defendant or the state becomes 
possessed of knowledge of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity to comprehend his 
situation or to properly make his defense, it becomes the duty of each to promptly 
bring the matter to the attention of the court”); Hajrusi v. State, No. A03-261, 2003 
WL 22481300, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003) (“If the prosecutor, defense 
attorney, or the court has reason to doubt the competency of the defendant, they are 
obligated to raise the issue, even over the defendant’s objection.”) (citing MINN. R. 
CRIM. P. 20.01). 
 172. See Ross, supra note 140, at 1345 (noting that there is “a growing body of 
clinical scholarship that recognizes that theory is more likely to be right when it 
emerges out of the practice of law”); see also Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Paul 
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on this issue is that it remains unconnected to practice and to the 
actual consequences to clients.173  Anthony Amsterdam famously 
described existing canons of ethics as “vaporous platitudes” that 
“have somewhat less usefulness as guides to lawyers in the 
predicaments of the real world than do valentine cards as guides to 
heart surgeons in the operating room.”174  My goal in applying the 
theory of ethics to actual cases is to be slightly more helpful than that. 
A. David Sherman175
David Sherman had no criminal record when he was arrested at his 
home and charged with several counts of kidnapping and second-
degree child sexual abuse.  According to the government, Mr. 
Sherman had taken two twelve-year-old children into a vacant 
apartment in their apartment building and forced them to touch 
each other sexually.  Although he was not charged with having 
molested the children in any way himself, he was facing the possibility 
of many years in prison.176  
When I spoke with Mr. Sherman for the first time, at the jail, it was 
immediately apparent to me that he was cognitively very slow.  
Speaking to him about the case was like speaking to a child.  Through 
a series of painstaking meetings with him, he eventually came to 
understand exactly what he was charged with and how the criminal 
justice system functioned.  Mr. Sherman and I spent many hours 
discussing his case and various aspects of the criminal justice system.  
R. Tremblay, Professional Ethics in Interdisciplinary Collaboratives:  Zeal, Paternalism, and 
Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 659 (2007) (supporting a theoretical 
discussion of the different ethical requirements of lawyers and social workers with 
two factual scenarios drawing on the authors’ experiences). 
 173. In addition to Professor Ross’s valuable article critically analyzing her 
experiences representing a mentally impaired client, Rodney Uphoff uses a similar 
approach in attempting to test theory through the crucible of actual practice, 
although not through the lens of his own experience.  See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role 
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Client:  Zealous 
Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 77–83 (detailing the tactical 
considerations and ethical dilemmas surrounding one lawyer’s decision to withhold 
concerns about her client’s competency). 
 174. Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 133, 138 (2008) (citing The Law:  Professional Ethics, TIME, May 13, 1966, at 
81). 
 175. The names “David Sherman” and “James Murphy” are pseudonyms that are 
used only for purposes of this Article.  In addition, I have slightly altered the 
accounts of their cases in order to protect their anonymity. 
 176. At that time, second-degree child sexual abuse carried a maximum penalty of 
imprisonment for ten years and kidnapping carried a maximum penalty of 
imprisonment for thirty years.  The penalties are the same under current statutes.  
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2001, 22-3009 (LexisNexis 2001).  Had Mr. Sherman been 
convicted of the counts, it is possible that each of the sentences would have been run 
consecutively.  Id. § 23-112. 
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I spoke many times with his mother, who filled me in on details of 
Mr. Sherman’s childhood and adolescence and who gave me valuable 
insights into his history and level of functioning.177  Mr. Sherman had 
never been diagnosed with a mental illness, but it certainly seemed 
likely that he had some pre-existing mental health problems that had 
worsened recently. 
In addition to learning about Mr. Sherman and spending time 
explaining the system to him, I also set out to investigate the case 
against him.  When my investigator and I talked to the two children, 
they appeared to be credible.  Nothing about their stories was 
unbelievable, and their versions of what happened did not contradict 
each other.  To make matters worse, the prosecutor gave me a 
videotape in which Mr. Sherman was questioned about the 
accusations and admitted to forcing the children to touch each other 
sexually in the apartment building.  The prospects of acquittal did 
not look good. 
Throughout the pre-trial period, Mr. Sherman’s competency was in 
question.  Because of the nature of the allegations and Mr. Sherman’s 
bizarre behavior on his first day in court, the judge had ordered a 
competency evaluation.  After the initial evaluation, Mr. Sherman 
was—surprisingly to me—found competent to stand trial, although 
the evaluation suggested that he was suffering from mental illness.  
Because Mr. Sherman had no prior criminal record, and because he 
seemed to be suffering from an untreated mental illness, the 
prosecutor made a generous offer to Mr. Sherman:  in exchange for a 
plea to a greatly reduced charge, the prosecutor would not ask for 
more than one year of incarceration and would recommend that the 
court then place him on a period of probation, on the condition that 
Mr. Sherman receive treatment for his mental illness.  Weighed 
against the likelihood of a much harsher sentence if we were to lose 
at trial and the strong evidence against him, this offer was a good 
one.  I advised Mr. Sherman to accept this plea offer, and he agreed 
that it made sense.  Relatively early in the case, Mr. Sherman entered 
a plea of guilty to the reduced charge. 
 177. Much of the literature on surrogate decision-making for mentally impaired 
client advises that the lawyer consult closely with family members and others close to 
the client and attempt through those inquiries to determine what the client would 
want if not for the mental impairment.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (2000) (“The lawyer should take reasonable steps to 
elicit the client’s own views on decisions necessary to the representation.  Sometimes 
the use of a relative, therapist, or other intermediary may facilitate 
communication.”).  The reality of the lives of indigent mentally ill criminal 
defendants, unfortunately, is that no family or other support structures exist for the 
lawyer to consult.  Mr. Sherman was lucky in this regard. 
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Because Mr. Sherman had been found competent to stand trial, he 
was detained in the jail, rather than in the mental hospital for pre-
trial detainees whose competency has been questioned or who have 
been found incompetent.  At the jail, he received no treatment and 
no medication for his mental illness.  As a result, while he was 
awaiting sentencing in the case, Mr. Sherman’s mental illness spiraled 
out of control.  During a visit a few weeks after he had pled guilty, Mr. 
Sherman appeared disheveled and disoriented; he told me he wanted 
a trial and he knew that God would protect him.  I explained to him 
that it was possible to withdraw his guilty plea if he wanted to do that, 
and that the judge would probably allow him to do so because it was 
still soon after he took the plea.  I also advised him, however, that it 
still would be a bad idea to withdraw his guilty plea, for all of the 
reasons that made him accept the offer in the first place.  Mr. 
Sherman was adamant that he wanted a trial and adamant that he 
wanted to testify.  When I asked him what sort of defense he wanted 
to present, all he would tell me was that his God was “a mighty God” 
and that God would tell him what to say. 
Mr. Sherman’s case demonstrates why a simplistic understanding of 
competency is unworkable and could do real harm to mentally 
impaired criminal defendants without meaningfully vindicating any 
real principle of client autonomy.  If I had simply done what Mr. 
Sherman told me he wanted me to do, I would have been listening 
only to the mental illness, rather than the person.  Not only would 
such an approach have failed to promote Mr. Sherman’s autonomy in 
any meaningful sense of the word but it would also have caused 
irreparable damage to Mr. Sherman, who would very likely have been 
convicted at trial and received a lengthy prison sentence.  Under 
Dusky, Mr. Sherman may well have been considered competent even 
in the throes of his mental illness.178  He understood factually what he 
was charged with; he could explain the roles of the various players 
involved in his case; and he had some degree of rational 
understanding of the charges against him and the defenses available 
to him.  When I asked him to describe for me what a trial was, he was 
able to articulate that it was something where people came in and 
said what happened, and the jury decided who to believe.  Mr. 
Sherman was able to tell me that the prosecutor’s job was to put him 
in jail and that my job was to keep him out of jail.  He understood 
that he would go to jail if the jury thought he had grabbed the 
 178. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (requiring that a 
defendant have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against her 
and the ability to communicate rationally with her lawyer). 
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children off of the street and made them touch each other.  Under 
the traditional standard of competency, therefore, he would probably 
be found competent. 
It was obvious to me, however, that Mr. Sherman was not thinking 
rationally about his situation or about his options.  In coming to this 
conclusion, of course, I had the advantage of having talked 
extensively with Mr. Sherman while he was far more lucid.  I was also 
able to see the contrast between the more rational Mr. Sherman and 
the more delusional Mr. Sherman.  He knew he had a right to testify 
and insisted on speaking to the jury, but he would only tell me that 
God would protect him.  He refused to talk about specific witnesses, 
pieces of evidence, or defense theories, but he insisted on going to 
trial.  When I spoke to Mr. Sherman about his mental illness and 
whether we should raise that issue with the court, he told me that he 
did not want to do that because it would delay his trial.  Unlike Dusky, 
Slobogin and Mashburn’s test for competency focuses on “basic 
rationality and self-regard.”179  Mr. Sherman would have to be 
considered incompetent under this standard because he was—in my 
opinion—unable to give non-delusional reasons for his decision to 
withdraw his guilty plea and because he lacked sufficient self-regard 
to consider alternative reasons and courses of action.  The question 
was, in Mr. Sherman’s case, whether to (1) move to withdraw his 
guilty plea without raising any issue of competency; (2) indicate to 
the court his expressed desire to withdraw his guilty plea but also 
indicate my own opinion that Mr. Sherman had become 
incompetent; or (3) not say anything to the court about Mr. 
Sherman’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea.  The difficulty of this 
decision was compounded by the knowledge that one of the factors a 
court considers in deciding whether to allow a defendant to withdraw 
a guilty plea is how promptly the desire to withdraw the plea is made 
known to the court.  In other words, the longer I waited in 
determining our next move, the less likely it was that the judge would 
allow Mr. Sherman to withdraw his plea. 
After much consultation and discussion about what to do in Mr. 
Sherman’s case, I went against his expressed wishes and raised the 
issue of competency.  I told the court that Mr. Sherman had 
expressed his desire to withdraw his plea and go to trial.  However, I 
went on to explain that, in my opinion, though he had been 
 179. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1641 (proposing a test for 
competency that focuses on the client’s (1) understanding of the criminal process, 
(2) ability to make decisions based on non-delusional reasoning, and (3) 
consideration of alternative decisions). 
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competent to plead guilty, his mental state had deteriorated to a 
point where he was no longer competent to make such a decision.  At 
the time, Mr. Sherman was lucid enough to understand what I had 
done and was outraged by my actions.  However, I believed that the 
motivation behind Mr. Sherman’s decision to withdraw his plea was 
only his mental illness, rather than a rational belief that either that 
we could win the trial or that he was actually innocent.180  Ultimately, 
the fact that Mr. Sherman was unable to articulate any rational reason 
for his desire to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial made 
me somewhat comfortable in acting against his expressed interest. 
The course of action I chose in Mr. Sherman’s case was well within 
my ethical obligations.  Under the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards, I was required to raise the issue of Mr. Sherman’s 
competency.181  Under the American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct and 
the Restatement, I was required to act in accordance with what Mr. 
Sherman’s wishes would have been if not for the mental illness that 
made his rational consideration impossible.182  In this unique case, I 
believed Mr. Sherman expressed his true interests to me and I acted 
on them by entering his initial guilty plea.  On these occasions, Mr. 
Sherman appeared competent enough to understand his situation.  
Still, even though I believed that I was well within my ethical 
obligations to Mr. Sherman and also believed that I was preventing 
him from harming himself, was I not also doing some violence to the 
principle of autonomy and betraying the concept of client-centered 
lawyering? 
The concept of client autonomy and the principle of client-
centered lawyering have meaning only to the extent that the client in 
question has the ability to think rationally.  If the voice that is 
speaking is not that of the client but rather of the mental illness that 
has control of the client, then it would be irresponsible for the lawyer 
to follow the commands of the voice simply out of “principle.”183  To 
 180. Of course, another rational reason that one could choose to plead guilty is to 
accept responsibility and “pay one’s debt to society.”  As with the other rational 
reasons for making such a choice, I was confident that this was not Mr. Sherman’s 
motivation. 
 181. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989) (explaining 
when defense counsel has a reasonable belief that the defendant is incompetent, 
counsel must make the issue known to the court). 
 182. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text (discussing the flexible 
approaches in the American Lawyers’ Code of Conduct and Restatement and noting how 
both approaches are realistic and emphasize that the defense lawyer’s primary 
obligation is to her client’s best interest). 
 183. To illustrate this principle, Slobogin and Mashburn use the extreme example 
of a person who is unable to speak and, when asked a question, involuntarily and 
randomly either nods her head “yes” or shakes her head “no.”  Nobody would argue 
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the extent that there exists a continuum between a “client autonomy” 
model of lawyering and a “paternalistic” model of lawyering, the first 
model depends upon the assumption of a client who is able to make 
rational choices.184
Because of the concerns I raised about Mr. Sherman’s competency, 
the judge would not allow him to withdraw the plea.  She told Mr. 
Sherman that she was going to send him from the jail to the mental 
hospital for forty-five days to see how he did.  The judge also 
explained to him that, at the end of that period, if she thought he was 
competent and if he still wanted to withdraw his plea, she would allow 
him to do so.  Once he was prescribed and began taking medication 
at the mental hospital, Mr. Sherman’s condition improved 
remarkably.  Within a few weeks, he seemed like his old self—still 
suffering from mental illness but able to make decisions with some 
degree of rationality and to articulate the reasons behind his desires.  
When I explained his options again, Mr. Sherman seemed not to 
remember clearly that he had wanted to withdraw his plea and go to 
trial, and he was very sure that he did not want to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  Some time later, we proceeded to sentencing, and the judge 
placed Mr. Sherman on probation, ordering that he receive 
counseling and ongoing medication.  Two years later, when I was 
working at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, 
Mr. Sherman called me and asked if he could stop by.  We met in my 
office and he told me that he was doing great on probation, had 
gotten a job, and was thinking about getting married.  In the end, it 
seems to have been a good idea to go against the desires that Mr. 
Sherman had expressed while he was mentally impaired.  Had we 
gone to trial, it is likely that Mr. Sherman would have been convicted 
of kidnapping and other serious charges, and would have received a 
lengthy prison sentence.  By substituting my own judgment for that of 
the psychotic Mr. Sherman (and depriving him temporarily of his 
that taking some important action on the basis of her head nods or shakes would be 
appropriate or that doing so would vindicate any principle of autonomy.  Slobogin & 
Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1587. 
 184. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy:  Mrs. Jones’ Case,  
50 MD. L. REV. 213, 224–25 (1991) (noting the similarities between the refined 
paternalist and autonomy approaches and the failure of each approach to be fully 
grounded in the value of autonomy); cf. Ross, supra note 140, at 1377 (“I valued Ms. 
Teplinski’s choice and autonomy less than I valued it in my other clients because I 
believed that she was a woman in mental anguish.  Choice and autonomy have little 
meaning to a person in the convulsions of a mental disease.”). 
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autonomy), I believe that I was able to both serve his best interests 
and protect his true autonomy in a more meaningful sense.185
B. James Murphy 
James Murphy had been awaiting trial at St. Elizabeths Hospital186 
for eight months when I met him.  Mr. Murphy had no criminal 
record whatsoever and was charged with a non-violent, low-level 
crime.  Mr. Murphy, who had a history of addiction to prescription 
medication, had been charged with fraudulently attempting to obtain 
prescription medication by pretending to be a doctor. 
Because of his erratic behavior during his arrest and in court, Mr. 
Murphy was ordered detained for a mental evaluation.  Not 
surprisingly, the evaluation indicated that Mr. Murphy was not 
competent to stand trial.  Although the judge had the option to allow 
Mr. Murphy to remain at liberty pending a full competency hearing, 
he decided to send him to St. Elizabeths.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that he had no history of violence or any criminal record, Mr. 
 185. In his discussion of paternalism and autonomy, David Luban tells the story of 
Benedict Spinoza being saved from an angry mob by his landlord and friend, Van 
der Spyck.  David Luban, supra note 9, at 461.  In 1672, an enraged royalist mob 
burst into a Dutch prison and killed two men suspected of disloyalty to the Prince of 
Orange.  Id.  Spinoza, who had been a friend of the men, heard the news of their 
deaths and immediately set out to confront the mob, having prepared a sign that 
read “Ultimi Barbarorum.”  (The Latin phrase translates roughly as “you are the 
greatest of all barbarians.”)  Id.  However, before he had a chance to confront the 
mob, Van der Spyck locked Spinoza in his house, saving his life in the process.  
Three years later, Spinoza published his classic treatise, “Ethics.”  Id.  Luban cites the 
Spinoza story as an example of justifiable paternalism.  See id. at 461–62 
(commenting that where a subject’s judgment is obviously impaired and the actor is 
convinced that the subject will approve of the actions when he regains his senses, 
actions in depriving liberty and free will—like those of Van der Spyck—may be 
justifiable). 
 186. Commissioned by Congress in 1852 as the Government Hospital for the 
Insane, St. Elizabeths is still the public mental hospital that serves the District of 
Columbia.  See Joe Holley, Tussle Over St. Elizabeths, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at C1 
(reporting on the opposition to the proposed use of the St. Elizabeths property as 
the new home of the Department of Homeland Security).  The most famous former 
resident of St. Elizabeths was the poet Ezra Pound, who was confined there from 
1946–1958 after having been found incompetent to stand trial on a charge of 
treason.  Pound’s case, however, is anything but the usual tale of an incompetent 
defendant languishing in pre-trial institutional confinement while he waits to be 
restored to competency.  According to at least one account, every doctor who 
examined Pound found him to be perfectly sane, but the superintendent of the 
hospital, Dr. Winfred Overholser, Sr., allowed Pound to remain at the hospital 
indefinitely in order to escape criminal prosecution on the capital charge of treason.  
Ben A. Franklin, Hospital Once ‘Home’ for Ezra Pound, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1982, at B6.  
During his twelve years at St. Elizabeths, Pound was allowed to stay in his own private 
room overlooking the U.S. Capitol, was brought books from the Library of Congress 
upon request, received special food, and was allowed regularly to meet with visitors.  
Id. 
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Murphy was detained at St. Elizabeths for eight months while his 
competency to stand trial remained in question. 
Before I met Mr. Murphy, I reviewed his file.  I was struck by the 
fact that he had been detained for so long on such a minor charge.  
Even if he had been convicted of the charge, he probably would have 
received a probationary sentence.  Even before having met my client, 
I was struck by the apparent injustice of his situation, and I 
proceeded on the assumption that the most important thing to do 
right away was to get him released from the mental hospital. 
When I met Mr. Murphy, he clearly and unequivocally told me he 
wanted to be back on the streets and never to have a felony 
conviction.  He also told me that President Bush had personally 
orchestrated his arrest and incarceration and that operatives from the 
Republican National Committee had tried to kidnap him and were 
now trying to have him killed.  As he continued to explain his story, it 
became clear that Mr. Murphy was severely mentally ill and that his 
understanding about what was happening to him had absolutely no 
basis in reality. 
Shortly after that visit with Mr. Murphy, I was able to persuade the 
judge to release him.  I told the judge that—speaking as Mr. 
Murphy’s counsel—I had no concerns with Mr. Murphy proceeding 
to trial and that I saw no reason for him to remain incarcerated at the 
mental hospital prior to his court date.  In truth, the question of 
whether he was competent to stand trial was a close call.  Mr. Murphy 
certainly had a factual understanding of who the various players were 
in court and what their roles were.  He knew, for example, that I was 
the defense attorney and that it was my job to help him.  However, he 
also thought that I was covertly working for George W. Bush and, 
therefore, secretly planning to convict, silence, and ultimately kill 
him.  He also believed that the government witnesses were receiving 
payments from the Republican National Committee in order to 
convict him and further claimed firsthand knowledge that the 
President had ordered the trial judge to obtain a conviction.  As such, 
it could certainly be argued that Mr. Murphy lacked a rational 
understanding of the case against him. 
During the entire course of my representation of Mr. Murphy, his 
mental illness (and his lack of a rational understanding of the case) 
clouded his thinking.  He demanded that I call as character witnesses 
various United States Senators, Supreme Court Justices, and White 
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House staffers.187  During trial, Mr. Murphy repeatedly told the judge 
that I was a part of the conspiracy against him and that he wanted a 
new lawyer.  Each time, the judge refused. 
Throughout most of the pre-trial proceedings, Mr. Murphy wanted 
to fire me and to represent himself.  For reasons that were never 
clear, the judge refused to grant this request and instead told Mr. 
Murphy that if he still wanted to represent himself on the day of trial, 
he would be allowed to do so.188  Until then, however, the judge 
refused to allow Mr. Murphy to represent himself and refused to 
allow me to withdraw as counsel.  Although the judge may have been 
motivated by a desire to help Mr. Murphy, his ruling had the effect of 
placing limitations on Mr. Murphy’s autonomy in an inappropriate 
and damaging way.  In essence, the judge was denying Mr. Murphy 
the dignity of representing himself, instead forcing him to deal with a 
lawyer he believed to be actively working against him.189
Just before trial, Mr. Murphy decided that he wanted me to 
represent him, and I pursued a strategy of convincing the jury to 
convict him only of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor 
attempted possession of a controlled substance, arguing that there 
had been no fraudulent conduct.  Throughout the trial, Mr. Murphy 
publicly and privately railed against the Bushes, the trial judge, me, 
the Public Defender Service, and others that he thought were 
conspiring to label him a felon and thereby silence him.  He never 
wavered in his belief that prominent members of the Republican 
Party were conspiring behind the scenes to convict him.  Surprisingly, 
 187. After doing some investigation and confirming that none of them had ever 
heard of Mr. Murphy, I told him that I would not call them as witnesses. 
 188. Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right of self-representation, and 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid state and federal governments from 
forcing counsel on a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives her right to 
counsel.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment 
does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the 
accused personally the right to make his defense.”).  But see Indiana v. Edwards, 128 
S. Ct. 2379, 2386-87 (2008) (stating that the right to self-representation is not 
absolute in that a criminal defendant may be constitutionally competent to proceed 
to trial but incompetent to waive counsel). 
 189. On a more mundane level, Mr. Murphy was unable to subpoena the witnesses 
he wanted for trial.  When the character witnesses he wanted to call informed my 
investigator and me that they did not know Mr. Murphy, I told him that I refused to 
call them.  Had Mr. Murphy been representing himself, he could have had the 
witnesses placed under subpoena himself.  See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 17(b)(2) 
(allowing defendants not represented by counsel to make ex parte applications for 
subpoenas).  Because he was represented by counsel, however, Mr. Murphy was 
deprived of the right to make that strategic decision.  See id. at 17(b)(1) (detailing 
the requirements that defense counsel—rather than the defendant—must fulfill in 
requesting a subpoena). 
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neither the judge nor the prosecutor ever re-visited the issue of Mr. 
Murphy’s competency.  For strategic reasons, neither did I. 
After some colorful testimony from Mr. Murphy and an 
unforgettable trial, the jury acquitted him of the felony charges, 
finding him guilty of only a single lesser charge, a misdemeanor, for 
which he received a sentence of the time that he had already served.  
As a result, Mr. Murphy retains his right to vote and remains free 
from the stigma of having ever been convicted of a felony. 
C. Substitution of Judgment:  Reconciling the Choices 
Why did I feel equally comfortable raising the issue of competency 
in Mr. Sherman’s case (and indeed, arguing strenuously against my 
client’s expressed wishes) and not raising my doubts about 
competency in Mr. Murphy’s case?190  The answer, of course, is that 
the potential consequences were very different for each client.  I 
knew that, even if Mr. Murphy were convicted of the felony charges, 
he would almost certainly not have received any additional jail time.  
In contrast, a conviction in Mr. Sherman’s case would have meant 
many years of incarceration.  Although there are ways to distinguish 
the cases and justify my actions based on the different characteristics 
of the clients and the different complexities of the cases,191 such 
 190. A lack of candor is one thing and affirmatively lying to the court is—or might 
be—another.  See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 59, at 771 (arguing that lawyers are 
permitted—and at times are ethically required—to lie to judges).  This view, to say 
the least, has proven controversial.  Although I find Freedman’s arguments on this 
issue persuasive, Mr. Sherman’s situation did not put me in the position of having to 
decide whether to apply Freedman’s theory in practice.  If the judge asked me 
specifically whether I had any doubts about my client’s competency, one approach 
would have been to refuse to answer.  To do so, of course, would have been 
tantamount to an affirmative answer and, I believe, as much a violation of my 
obligation to protect confidences and secrets as would an affirmative answer.  See id. 
at 773 (contending that to remain silent when a judge inquires as to the likelihood of 
a client’s guilt, an attorney may lead a judge to infer guilt). 
 191. Legally, there is no sliding scale of competency that is based on the 
seriousness of the case or the potentially serious consequences that may flow from a 
conviction.  See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397–98 (1993) (holding that one 
uniform standard of competency should be applied to defendants at all phases of the 
criminal process).  The examples of Mr. Sherman and Mr. Murphy, however, 
illustrate why a model of “decisional competency” is a more meaningful construct to 
determine whether a defendant is competent to proceed in the case against him.  
Mr. Sherman’s situation was significantly more complicated than Mr. Murphy’s, at 
the time Mr. Sherman became incompetent.  To make an informed, rational 
decision, after already admitting guilt, Mr. Sherman had to be able to understand 
what it meant to withdraw a guilty plea, the likelihood of success both in convincing 
the judge to allow him to withdraw his plea and then in winning the trial, the 
potential that he would—if convicted at trial—be sentenced by a judge far more 
punitive than the judge he had been assigned, and the ins and outs of what would be 
a fairly long and somewhat complicated trial.  Because the nature of his charge and 
his pre-trial posture were simpler, however, Mr. Murphy had a much simpler decision 
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justifications would be disingenuous.  The truth is that I believed my 
ethical obligation to both clients was informed by the actual likely 
consequences of my actions.  My relative lack of candor to the court 
in Mr. Murphy’s case was justified by the harm that I would have 
caused him had I been entirely candid with the court. 
In Mr. Murphy’s case, I substituted my judgment for his in many 
ways, but not in any of those areas reserved for defendants 
themselves.  I agreed with Mr. Murphy’s decisions to reject the 
government’s plea offer and to demand a jury trial.  On the other 
hand, I strongly disagreed with his decision to testify.  Mr. Murphy 
insisted on calling as character witnesses many nationally prominent 
Democratic politicians who he claimed would vouch for him.  After I 
investigated his claims and none of these figures claimed to know 
anything about Mr. Murphy, he still insisted that I call them as 
witnesses and ask them under oath if they were friends of Mr. 
Murphy.  When I explained to him that this approach would be 
counter-productive and I refused to do it, Mr. Murphy took that as 
proof that I was a member of the conspiracy against him. 
Throughout the time that I represented him, Mr. Murphy 
consistently lacked a rational understanding of the charges against 
him, in my opinion.  Just as Mr. Sherman’s inability to give rational 
reasons for his decisions rendered him incompetent to withdraw his 
plea, Mr. Murphy’s inability to give rational explanations for why he 
was being prosecuted probably rendered him incompetent to stand 
trial and unable to assist his counsel in any meaningful way.  I 
believed throughout the time that I represented Mr. Murphy that his 
understanding of the charges against him, although factually correct, 
was irrational.  Because of his delusions, he was also utterly unable to 
assist me in preparing his defense.  Under the ABA’s Criminal Justice 
Mental Health Standards, therefore, I should have informed the 
Court not only of my belief that Mr. Murphy may be incompetent, 
but also of those facts that led me to question Mr. Murphy’s 
competency.192  This requirement would presumably include facts and 
to make.  It is possible to argue, then, that a criminal defendant facing serious and 
complex charges must possess a greater degree of rational understanding than a 
defendant facing a simple charge.  For this logical reason, a sliding scale of 
decisional competency for criminal defendants based on the nature of the 
allegations against them would serve the values of dignity and autonomy far more 
than the simplistic unitary standard endorsed by Godinez. 
 192. Interestingly, Slobogin and Mashburn also take the position that I should 
have been required to disclose my doubts about Mr. Murphy’s competency to the 
trial judge.  See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1622 (arguing that defense 
attorneys should be ethically bound to inform the court of possible incompetency 
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beliefs that Mr. Murphy had told me in confidence during the course 
of my representation of him. 
The example of Mr. Murphy demonstrates why the approach 
endorsed in the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards is 
unworkable and incompatible with the criminal defense lawyer’s duty 
of zealous representation.  It is as dramatically demonstrated every 
day when mentally impaired people are charged with misdemeanors, 
for which little or no jail time would be imposed even in the event of 
a conviction.  A lawyer should not be required to take action that 
affirmatively hurts her client.  Were I to bring up my doubts about 
Mr. Murphy’s competency, the result would have been a swift return 
to the locked ward at the mental hospital for an indeterminate and 
potentially endless stay.193  The duties of zealous representation and 
protection of client confidences should trump any rule that requires 
a criminal defense lawyer to raise her doubts about her client’s 
competency, without regard to the consequences of such action. 
V. TOWARD A MORE MEANINGFUL ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
Its limitations notwithstanding, the Dusky test remains the federal 
constitutional standard, and there is no indication that courts are 
likely to revisit the issue and institute a more meaningful or useful 
standard.194  How, then, does a criminal defense lawyer to go about 
based on the primacy of their obligation to seek appropriate medical treatment for 
their clients). 
 193. To be sure, the analysis in Mr. Murphy’s case would be very different if the 
criminal justice system provided more meaningful, humane, and palatable mental 
health treatment.  Because he was an indigent defendant in a crowded urban 
jurisdiction, however, his only option within the criminal justice system was what 
Rodney Uphoff has called “maximum security . . . with minimum treatment.”  
Uphoff, supra note 173, at 71–72; see also Ross, supra note 140, at 1384 (“Were 
incompetent clients not routinely institutionalized, my dilemma would have been 
lessened.  Imagine if a finding of incompetence meant treatment in an outpatient 
setting.  Instead of being a threat, a finding of incompetence would then be a viable 
alternative.  If the hospital to which she was sent was a good place to be, . . . that too 
would have lessened my dilemma.”). 
 194. Bruce Winick and Richard Bonnie have engaged in a spirited debate about 
changing the law on adjudication of incompetent defendants, and reforming the 
legal regime under which competency is evaluated.  See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 106, 
at 543 (noting that Winick fails to recognize that the bar against adjudication of 
incompetent defendants serves the interests of the defendant and society); Bonnie, 
supra note 120, at 444–45 (proposing that judges actively use clinical evaluation to 
assess a defendant’s guilty plea, and that third-party representatives of the defendant 
involve themselves in the attorney-client relationship to assist in communication and 
ensure adequate legal representation); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency To 
Stand Trial and Plead Guilty:  A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 586 (1995) (responding to Bonnie’s criticism by 
declaring that the alleged “societal interests” of the incompetency doctrine may be 
more theoretical than real); Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency To Stand Trial:  An 
Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 245 
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evaluating her client about whose competency she has doubts, either 
in determining whether to raise the issue of competency against 
client wishes, or in evaluating whether (and to what extent) to defer 
to her client’s decisions about how to conduct the litigation.  In 
short, how does the defense lawyer determine how much decisional 
power to allocate to her questionably competent client? 
I propose that, regardless of the court’s adjudication of a 
defendant as competent under the Dusky/Godinez standard, a defense 
lawyer should conduct a separate analysis of her client’s decisional 
competency.  If the client does not possess the ability to make a 
rational decision, then the defense lawyer should consider herself 
free to engage in surrogate decision-making in the interests of 
protecting her client from harm.  At least five factors should be 
considered:  (1) the client’s ability to give rational reasons for the 
proposed course of action; (2) the client’s ability to rationally 
consider the negative consequences of the proposed action; (3) the 
client’s ability to consider alternative courses of action; (4) the 
vehemence with which the client holds the preference for the 
proposed course of action; and (5) the irreversibility of the proposed 
course of action.195  Built into these factors and underlying the 
analysis is the seriousness of the underlying charges against the client.  
A lawyer should undertake a consequentialist analysis of the 
(1987) (arguing that defendants and defense counsel should be permitted to waive 
incompetency status in favor of trial or a guilty plea rather than being bound by the 
court’s pre-trial determination).  The concern of Winick and Bonnie in this 
exchange has been proposing reforms for courts in dealing with putatively 
incompetent criminal defendants.  By contrast, the focus of this Article is not 
primarily systemic reform, but on the ethics of decision-making of the criminal 
defense lawyer within the current legal and ethical framework. 
 195. This test obviously builds on Slobogin and Mashburn’s “basic rationality and 
self-regard” model.  It also draws on the work of the Fordham Conference Capacity 
Working Group (“the Group”), which examined issues of client capacity and 
autonomy with the context of older clients.  The Group attempted to provide some 
needed guidance for the lawyer dealing with a marginally competent or questionably 
competent client, and to expand upon Model Rule 1.14.  The Group endorsed a 
guideline stating that whenever a lawyer questions her client’s capacity for any 
specific purpose, the lawyer should, inter alia: 
[c]onsider and balance factors including but not limited to the following:  
(a) The client’s ability to articulate reasoning behind the decision; (b) The 
variability of the client’s state of mind; (c) The client’s ability to appreciate 
consequences of the decision; (d) The irreversibility of the decision; (e) The 
substantive fairness of the decision; and (f) The consistency of the decision 
with lifetime commitments of the client. 
Report of Working Group on Client Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1994). 
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situation,196 and be guided by a flexible rather than a formalistic 
approach. 
On a case-by-case and decision-by-decision basis, the defense lawyer 
dealing with a questionably competent client should engage in this 
analysis and make the determination whether her client is 
decisionally competent to make the decision in question.  Only if the 
lawyer determines that the client is decisionally incompetent should 
the lawyer pursue a course of action at odds with the wishes of her 
client.  In conducting this inquiry, the lawyer should obviously err on 
the side of doing what her client wishes, and the lawyer must be 
careful not to simply substitute her own values and judgments 
whenever she disagrees with her client.197
The goals of the criminal justice system are not the same as the 
goals of the criminal defense attorney.  They never have been and 
they never should be.198  A criminal defense attorney who lists among 
her professional goals “the search for truth” will not (and should not) 
last long, either as a matter of ethics or as a matter of practice.  The 
defense attorney owes loyalty to one person—her client.  And in the 
same way that the defense attorney cannot principally be concerned 
with the system’s “truth-seeking” function, she cannot be concerned 
primarily with upholding the integrity of the system.  If upholding 
the integrity or moral authority of the system happens to coincide 
with the interests of her client—or, more precisely, if she can act in 
the service of the system without causing harm to her client—then 
she should act in her role as an officer of the court.  But if doing so 
would cause any harm to her client, then her role as officer of the 
court must yield to the duty she owes her client.  While the criminal 
 196. See generally Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1616 
(“Consequentialism posits that the appropriateness of a lawyer’s advice, decisions 
and actions should be judged by their consequences.”). 
 197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (2000) 
(“Lawyers . . . should be careful not to construe as proof of disability a client’s 
insistence on a view of the client’s welfare that a lawyer considers unwise or otherwise 
at variance with the lawyer’s own views.”). 
 198. Justice White acknowledged the different, and conflicting, goals of the 
defense lawyer and the criminal justice system in his concurring opinion in United 
States v. Wade: 
If [the criminal defense lawyer] can confuse a witness, even a truthful 
one . . . that will be his normal course. . . . [M]ore often than not, defense 
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, 
even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to 
destroy a witness who he thinks is lying.  In this respect, as part of our 
modified adversary system, and as part of the duty imposed on the most 
honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in 
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth. 
388 U.S. 218, 257–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
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justice system must be concerned with protecting the integrity of the 
system and the dignity of its participants, the defense attorney must 
neither dilute the principle of zeal that is central to her role nor 
irreparably harm the “sacred duty” that she owes her client. 
To restore zeal to its rightful place among the pantheon of 
principles for the defense attorney,199 courts should recognize that 
attorneys must be endowed with the discretion to make choices that 
serve the interests of their clients, as long as those choices comport 
with the applicable law and the binding rules of ethics.  Undoubtedly, 
those players in the system who do not owe any such duty to a 
client—the prosecutor and the judge—should be bound by their 
roles to raise the issue of competency whenever they have a good-
faith doubt.  But those courts that have uncritically placed a similar 
obligation on defense attorneys200 need to consider the irreparable 
harm that such a rule inflicts on the attorney-client relationship and 
the historic principle of zealous advocacy. 
Faced with a conflict between the mandatory duties of loyalty and 
zeal to her client, as well as a mandatory duty to protect client 
confidences and secrets, on one hand, and the nebulous idea of the 
lawyer as an “officer of the court” on the other, the ethical criminal 
defense lawyer must resolve the conflict in favor of her client’s 
interest.  Subordinating the lawyer’s general duties as officer of the 
court in this situation is the only meaningful way to give effect to the 
values of dignity and autonomy that are the goals of the adversarial 
system. 
The ABA should amend Standard 7-4.2(c) of its Criminal Justice 
Mental Health Standards to allow for more nuanced decision-
making201 by defense lawyers.202  Specifically, amended Standard  
7-4.2(c) should read as follows (with my proposed changes 
underlined and proposed deletions line-stricken): 
 Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good 
 199. Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1165. 
 200. E.g., In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610, 617 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (stating that 
defense counsel must raise the issue of client competency). 
 201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d (“A 
lawyer may bring the client’s diminished capacity before a tribunal when doing so is 
reasonably calculated to advance the client’s objectives or interests as the client 
would define them if able to do so rationally.”). 
 202. Obviously, those jurisdictions that have adopted Standard 7-4.2(c) and 
currently impose an obligation on defense lawyers to alert the court to any doubts 
about their client’s competency should amend those ethical rules to permit, rather 
than require, disclosure.  E.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01 (requiring defense attorneys 
who doubt the competency of their clients to raise this issue with the court). 
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faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence, unless doing so 
would be contrary to the interests of the defendant.  If the client 
objects to such a motion being made, counsel may move for 
evaluation over the client’s objection, only if defense counsel has a 
reasonable belief (a) that doing so would be in the interests of the 
client and (b) that the client’s objection is a product of mental 
illness or impairment.  If defense counsel believes that the client 
has a mental illness or impairment that is preventing the client 
from making a reasoned decision on this issue, defense counsel 
should make such a motion only if doing so would be in the 
interests of the client, as the client would define her interests in the 
absence of the mental illness or impairment.  In any event, If 
counsel determines that such motion is in the interests of the 
client, counsel should may make known to the court and to the 
prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith 
doubt of competence. 
This proposal begs the question:  how does the conscientious, 
zealous, client-centered defense lawyer determine what her client’s 
interests would be in the absence of mental illness or impairment? 
To make such a determination, lawyers should be encouraged to 
use a model of substituted judgment, but to do so in a way that guides 
the discretion of the lawyer.  Before raising the issue of client 
competency, a defense lawyer should balance the following factors:  
(1) the likely consequences of a finding of incompetency;203 (2) the 
likelihood of success at trial or benefits of a plea if counsel does not 
raise the issue of competency; (3) the tactical or strategic advantages 
and disadvantages to having an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
competency;204 (4) the degree of perceived mental impairment;  
(5) the seriousness of the charges facing the client; and (6) the 
client’s wishes and ability to give reasoned decisions either for raising 
or not raising the issue of competency.  In addition, counsel in this 
                                                          
 203. This factor will obviously vary greatly by jurisdiction.  Before raising the issue 
of competency, it is imperative that defense know the statutes that govern the 
likelihood and the duration of any civil commitment at a mental health facility, as 
well as the actual practice of what happens with criminal defendants who have been 
adjudicated incompetent.  In addition to these consequences, counsel needs to also 
consider the potential stigma attached to a finding of incompetency, and the likely 
impact of such a finding on her particular client.  On the other hand, a finding of 
incompetency obviously precludes a criminal conviction. 
 204. Just as an evidentiary hearing on competency could reveal aspects of the 
defense case to the prosecution (psychiatric experts, disclosure of information about 
the defendant, etc.), a competency hearing can be a strategic opportunity to learn 
about the prosecution’s case and to preserve an early record of the defendant’s 
psychiatric problems for possible use as defenses at trial.  Additionally, it can provide 
an early opportunity to gain the sympathy of the judge who may later preside over a 
trial and/or impose sentence.  AMSTERDAM, supra note 139, at 314–18. 
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situation should be encouraged to consult other lawyers, who can act 
as a check on the lawyer simply imposing her own values and beliefs 
on her client.205
A similar framework can and should be employed beyond the issue 
of whether or not to raise competency.  Whatever the lawyer decides 
to do on that issue, most defense lawyers are faced at some point with 
a client who had been found competent (or in whose case the issue 
of competency has not been raised) but who is unable meaningfully 
to assist in the decision-making that attends a criminal case.  As in the 
case of Mr. Sherman, the mentally impaired client presents a 
challenge to a defense lawyer who is trying simultaneously to honor 
the principle of client-centered representation and to zealously 
advocate for her client.  To simply listen to the mental illness neither 
honors the autonomy of the client nor advances the true interests of 
the client.206 
In the absence of a rule specifically requiring disclosure of a 
lawyer’s doubts about her client’s competency to proceed, the 
appropriate conclusion for a lawyer or a court to draw is that the 
lawyer’s duties of confidentiality and zeal prohibit her from revealing 
such doubts if they are adverse to her client’s interests.207  Rule 1.6 of 
 205. This is the approach taken by the lawyers for John Salvi, who was charged 
with murdering two women at a women’s clinic in Brookline, Massachusetts.  Salvi’s 
lawyers believed that their client was incompetent, but the judge ruled otherwise.  
Ross, supra note 140, at 1363 n.83.  After having been found competent, Salvi 
forbade his lawyers to pursue an insanity defense, which they believed to be his only 
viable defense.  Id.  Salvi’s lawyers assembled a team of experienced defense lawyers 
to help them decide how to proceed, and they concluded that they could ethically 
raise an insanity defense against their client’s wishes.  Id. 
 206. In many cases involving mentally impaired defendants, it is not at all clear—
even to the diligent, zealous, and conscientious lawyer—which course of action 
would “help” her client and which would “hurt” her client.  The lawyers for Russell 
Weston faced just such an unenviable dilemma.  Weston was charged with murdering 
two federal police officers and attempting to murder a third at the U.S. Capitol.  
Suffering from schizophrenia and driven by severe delusions, Weston forced his way 
into the U.S. Capitol and opened fire.  The trial judge found Weston incompetent to 
stand trial because of his psychosis and schizophrenia.  The only possibility of 
restoring his competency was anti-psychotic medication.  His lawyers found 
themselves having to decide between two courses of action:  resisting the anti-
psychotic medication (which their delusional client was instructing them to do) or 
arguing contrary to their client’s wishes in favor of the medication.  They were 
forced, therefore, to decide between advocating their client’s continued slide into 
deeper and deeper mental illness or, on the other hand, forcible medication that 
would have led to their client’s execution.  For an interesting discussion of the 
Weston case and a critique of the trial judge’s refusal to appoint Weston a guardian 
ad litem (which his lawyers had requested), see Sarah E. Wolf, The Mentally 
Incompetent Criminal Defendant:  United States v. Weston and the Need for a Guardian Ad 
Litem, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071 (2002). 
 207. Professor Fortune offers a similar analysis in a slightly different context.  See 
William H. Fortune, A Proposal To Require Lawyers To Disclose Information About 
Procedural Matters, 87 KY. L.J. 1099 (1999) (arguing that in the absence of a rule 
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the Model Rules, the more specific provision, should control.  In 
Rule 1.6, the default position is protection of client confidences, and 
the exception is candor.208
The attempt to create a standard for decision-making (or 
substitution of judgment) for mentally impaired clients has led to a 
variety of theories.  Josephine Ross argues for an “ethic of care” 
approach, in which she would “emphasize[] peoples’ interconnection 
and responsibility rather than their independence and autonomy.”209  
On the other end of the spectrum would be an “ethic of autonomy” 
approach, which would all but preclude a lawyer from substituting 
her own judgment for that of the client, regardless of mental 
impairment.  Additionally, there is what could be described as an 
“ethic of integrity” approach, which would focus on the formal right 
of a person not to be judged while incompetent (as well as the 
societal value in the integrity of the criminal justice process) and 
would value the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court over the 
lawyer’s role as an advocate for her client. 
requiring a defense attorney’s disclosure upon discovering a court’s procedural 
error, the duties of confidentiality and zeal require the attorney to remain silent). 
 208. Rule 1.6 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is 
permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests 
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used 
or is using the lawyer’s services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance 
of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; 
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these 
Rules; 
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a 
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or 
(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).  The broad duty of confidentiality is 
premised upon a belief that “the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule 
requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the 
representation of their clients,” id. at 1.6 cmt. 6, and that a strict rule of 
confidentiality will encourage people “to seek legal assistance and to communicate 
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject 
matter,” id. at 1.6 cmt. 4. 
 209. Ross, supra note 140, at 1372. 
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None of these approaches alone captures the nuance and difficulty 
of a criminal defense lawyer trying to figure out how to best represent 
a mentally impaired client.  The approaches that focus on the 
integrity of the system or on an abstract right of an individual not to 
undergo any sort of court proceeding while incompetent lead to a 
system in which the lawyer acts as a judge of her client and is required 
to subordinate her role as advocate to that of a guardian of the 
system.  Moreover, it requires the defense lawyer to take actions that 
would affirmatively cause harm to her client, including potentially 
indefinite confinement in a mental hospital for even very minor 
charges.  The “ethic of care” approach comes closer to an acceptable, 
client-centered model of lawyer decision-making for mentally 
impaired clients.  Its paternalistic bent, however, assumes a complete 
substitution of judgment in which the lawyer acts as a concerned 
parent might act, rather than as the client would act if competent, 
lucid, and rational.  Although these approaches are overlapping and 
interconnected, I propose that the conscientious defense lawyer 
should attempt not to do necessarily what is “best” for the mentally 
impaired client, but attempt to discern what the client’s wishes would 
be absent the mental impairment that prevents the client from 
making a rational decision.  This approach could include 
consultations not only with the client but also with family members 
and others who are close with the defendant.210  Such an approach 
may be cumbersome and is certainly easier in theory than in practice.  
It has, however, the virtues of imposing some sort of check on the 
discretion of the defense lawyer and of honoring the true autonomy 
of the client. 
CONCLUSION 
We return to the fundamental principle:  a lawyer should do no 
harm to her client.211  Although there are situations in which a lawyer 
 210.  Obviously, one of the complications with this approach arises from the 
lawyer’s need to protect client confidences.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 (prohibiting an attorney from revealing information relating to the client’s 
representation except in certain scenarios, such as when the client gives informed 
consent).  
 211. It is a widely held misconception that the phrase “first, do no harm” 
originated in the Hippocratic Oath.  In fact, those words do not appear in the 
Hippocratic Oath and never have.  In his book Epidemics, Hippocrates gave the 
following advice:  “As to diseases, make a habit of two things:  to help, or at least to 
do no harm.”  HIPPOCRATES, EPIDEMICS, BOOK I 165 (W. H. S. Jones trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1957). 
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is compelled to do just that,212 those situations are extremely rare, and 
even then, the lawyer is duty-bound to proceed in a manner that 
causes as little harm as possible, consistent with the laws and the rules 
of ethics. 
One of the most frequently offered justifications for a rule 
requiring attorneys to disclose any doubts about the competency of a 
client is a defense of the integrity of the system.213  A legal system that 
tolerates even the possibility of putting an incompetent defendant on 
trial, the argument goes, is necessarily an illegitimate system 
unworthy of respect.  The argument, however, is not so neat, and not 
so clearly on the side of mandating disclosure.  The dignity of a 
system that uses the attorney-client relationship to potentially consign 
mentally impaired criminal defendants to months or even years of 
pre-trial institutionalization solely by reason of their impairment is 
very much in question.  A marginally competent (or incompetent) 
defendant whose lawyer reveals to the court and opposing counsel 
her doubts about her client’s competency and the reasons for those 
doubts would certainly agree with this assertion.  As Monroe 
Freedman has argued, “Before we will permit the state to deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, we require that certain processes 
which ensure regard for the dignity of the individual be followed, 
irrespective of their impact on the determination of truth.”214  The 
relevant question, then, in the context of potentially incompetent 
criminal defendants, is not whether the system should contain 
protections for the dignity of those individuals, but which rule would 
more effectively serve that purpose. 
The unique nature of the attorney-client relationship is the aspect 
of the criminal justice system that most effectively protects the dignity 
of the individual and, necessarily, the moral authority of the system.215  
An adversarial system in which the attorney-client relationship is as 
close to sacrosanct as possible, and in which the attorney is 
empowered to advocate for her client as aggressively as possible, is 
the best way to ensure that the accused’s dignity interests are 
protected in a meaningful, rather than purely a theoretical or 
 212. In some situations, a lawyer may well feel justified in causing harm to her 
client.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (“A lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client . . . to prevent the client from 
committing a crime . . . .”). 
 213. See Bonnie, supra note 120, at 426–28 (identifying dignity, reliability, and 
autonomy as three reasons the system does not tolerate forcing the incompetent 
accused to trial). 
 214. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 
1065 (1975). 
 215. FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 2–8. 
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formalistic, sense.216  Overemphasis on the lawyer’s duty of candor 
toward the tribunal creates an “affirmative duty of betrayal”217 and 
destroys many of the values and protections that the American 
criminal justice system values.  Allowing the defense lawyer to fulfill 
her role as zealous advocate, and necessarily subordinating to that 
principle any obligation as an officer of the court, upholds the dignity 
of the system more than a regime of mandatory disclosure or strict 
candor.  Although a system that endows a defense lawyer with the 
discretion to substitute her judgment for that of her mentally 
impaired client has perils of its own, such substitution is the only way, 
when representing certain mentally impaired criminal defendants, to 
meaningfully vindicate the ideals of zeal and dignity that should 
define the practice of criminal defense. 
 216. Id. 
 217. H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles:  A Reaction to 
Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (1975). 
